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Abstract 
Attentional biases to threat are thought to play a central role in the development and 
maintenance of anxiety disorders. Various measures have been developed to index these 
biases; unfortunately, the psychometric properties of many common measures of attentional 
bias have not been thoroughly evaluated, and the reliability of those that have been evaluated 
is poor.  
Three studies assessed the reliability and convergent validity of dot probe and 
emotional cueing bias scores. Study 1 used a dot probe task and an emotional cueing task that 
were designed to be as similar as possible to each other (e.g., in terms of display and timing 
parameters) in an attempt to maximize convergent validity. One hundred fifty-eight 
participants, selected for high and low levels of trait anxiety, completed the two tasks. The 
results of Study 1 showed no significant attentional biases to threat, and the psychometric 
properties of the bias scores were poor. 
Study 2 investigated the psychometric properties of measures of early attention to 
threat using another dot probe task and another emotional cueing task. One hundred twelve 
participants, again selected for high and low levels of trait anxiety, completed the study. The 
results of Study 2 again showed no significant attentional biases in the high trait anxiety 
group, and the psychometric properties of the bias scores were poor. 
To increase the likelihood of producing large and potentially reliable attentional 
biases, Study 3 replicated the methodology from two classic studies in the literature and also 
included a state anxiety manipulation. One hundred sixty participants completed an anxious 
or calm mood induction, which consisted of listening to music while thinking of an anxiety-
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provoking or calming event in their lives, followed by dot probe and emotional cueing tasks. 
Reliability estimates for bias scores were low, ranging from 0 to .44. The convergent validity 
estimates were also low. The anxiety induction did not substantially improve reliability or 
convergent validity of the bias scores. 
Overall, the results of these studies improve our understanding of factors that affect 
the reliability of attentional bias scores. These results also provide some of the first estimates 
of the reliability and convergent validity of scores from the emotional cueing task. 
Implications for research and for clinical assessment and intervention are discussed. 
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Chapter 1 
General Introduction 
Anxiety is thought to be characterized by a cognitive style in which the processing of 
threatening information is prioritized (e.g., Mathews, 1990; Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, 
Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van Ijzendoorn, 2007). This attentional bias to threat (ABT) is seen 
as a causal factor in the development and maintenance of anxiety and anxiety disorders (see Van 
Bockstaele, Verschuere, Crombez, Tibboel, Koster, & De Houwer, 2014, for a review). For 
example, Mathews and MacLeod (2002) speculated that for high trait anxious individuals, 
especially when under stress, attention is captured by even mild threat cues. These individuals 
frequently attend to possible threats over other types of information, which leads in turn to 
increased anxiety (Mathews & Macleod, 2002). Other cognitive theories of anxiety disorders 
also suggest that ABT plays an important role in causing or maintaining anxiety (e.g., Bar-Haim 
et al., 2007; Beck & Clark, 1997; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997).  
Multiple theories explaining the phenomenology of ABT in high anxious individuals 
have been advanced. The two most prominent ABT theories are the vigilance-avoidance 
hypothesis (e.g., Mogg, Mathews, & Weinman, 1987) and the delayed disengagement hypothesis 
(e.g., Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001). The vigilance-avoidance hypothesis posits that 
individuals initially direct attention to threat stimuli over neutral stimuli; after some time, 
however, they then avoid the threat stimuli. The delayed disengagement hypothesis, in contrast, 
proposes that attention is not necessarily directed preferentially toward threat initially. Once 
threat is attended, however, anxious individuals have difficulty diverting their attention away 
from it. Many studies have focused on understanding the phenomenology of ABT in different 
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populations and under different conditions (e.g., timescale, stimulus conditions, etc.), and 
support for both of these hypotheses has been found. Thus, ABT can present as facilitated 
attention, delayed disengagement, or avoidance, depending on the timescale and stimulus 
conditions (see Weierich, Treat & Hollingworth, 2008, for a review).  
1.1.1 Measuring ABT 
 A variety of methodological paradigms have been used to examine anxiety-related ABT. 
Some of the most common of these are the emotional cueing paradigm, the Stroop paradigm, the 
dot probe paradigm, and eye-tracking paradigms. A large amount of research has been conducted 
using these paradigms. For example, over 100 studies on ABT were included in a 2007 review 
paper (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). Despite their frequent use, however, researchers have only 
recently begun to evaluate the psychometric properties of ABT measures resulting from these 
tasks. This dissertation examines the reliability and convergent validity of bias scores from dot 
probe and emotional cueing tasks in participants with low and high trait anxiety. First, these 
paradigms are described in some detail. 
1.1.2 Dot Probe Paradigm 
In the dot probe paradigm, participants are presented with a display that includes a threat cue 
(e.g., a threat word or an angry face) and a neutral cue. After a short interval, the cues disappear 
and a target appears in the location previously occupied by one of the cues. (See Figure 1 for an 
illustration). In a congruent trial, the target appears in the location of the threat cue. In an 
incongruent trial, the target appears in the location of the neutral cue. Typically, half of the trials 
are congruent and half are incongruent. Participants are asked to respond as quickly and 
accurately as possible to the target on some dimension (e.g., location or identity). Responses are 
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assumed to be faster when the target appears in an attended location than in an unattended 
location; thus, faster responses on congruent trials than on incongruent trials are interpreted as an 
attentional “bias” toward threat.  
The overall bias score (mean RT on incongruent trials – mean RT on congruent trials) is the 
most common method of computing bias in the dot probe task, but it is not the only method. 
Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, and De Houwer (2004) argued that the bias score described above 
does not differentiate between facilitated attention towards threat and difficulty disengaging from 
threat. Facilitated attention refers to accelerated attention toward the threat information over 
neutral information. Difficulty disengaging refers to difficulty moving attention away from threat 
information compared with neutral information, once it has been attended. Koster and colleagues 
(2004) proposed an alternate method of calculating attentional bias scores that requires a neutral 
condition (two neutral cues; no threat cues) as a baseline. Using this method, faster RTs on 
congruent trials in comparison with neutral trials indicate facilitated attention towards threat 
stimuli. In contrast, slower RTs on incongruent trials as compared to neutral trials indicate a 
difficulty in disengaging from threat stimuli. Cisler, Baker, and Williams (2009) recommend this 
method of calculating scores in addition to the traditional method, and some recent studies 
examining ABT in clinical populations have begun to use this method of calculation (e.g., 
Cooper & Langton, 2006; Stevens, Rist, & Gerlach, 2009; Waechter, Nelson, Wright, Hyatt, & 
Oakman, 2014) along with the traditional bias score.  
Dozens of published studies have found evidence for ABT using the dot probe task (e.g., see 
Bar-Haim, 2007, for a meta-analysis and review), but a few published studies have found no 
evidence for such biases (e.g., Mogg, Bradley, Dixon, Fisher, Twelftree & McWilliams, 2000 in 
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high trait anxiety; Bradley et al., 1997 in high social anxiety). These contradictory results have 
typically been attributed to differing experimental methodologies (e.g., Bögels & Mansell, 2004). 
Given that dot probe tasks in the literature vary widely on many factors, including stimuli (faces, 
words, scenes or objects), task (detection, localization, or identification), participants (clinical or 
non-clinical samples), timing parameters, display parameters, and number of trials, this assertion 
by Bögels and Mansell (2004) is certainly possible. In fact, a meta-analysis on attentional bias 
(Bar-Haim et al. 2007) found evidence for a moderating role of timing such that differences 
between anxious and control participants were significant for subliminal (e.g., <60 ms and then 
masked: McNally, Amir, & Lipke, 1996; Mogg, Bradley, Williams, & Mathews, 1993) and 500 
ms exposures, but failed to reach significance for longer (e.g., 1,000 ms; Bar-Haim et al., 2007) 
exposures. Bar-Haim et al. (2007)’s meta-analysis also suggested that the stimuli (e.g., words vs. 
pictures) may be an important factor in certain contexts. For example, in studies with clinically 
anxious participants, there was a significant attentional bias with words but not with pictures. In 
studies using subclinical anxious participants, the bias was significant with both words and 
pictures (Bar-Haim et al. 2007).  
Thus, there is some strong evidence that dot probe effects are moderated by methodological 
factors. At least one recent study, however, has found inconsistent results in two experiments 
using nearly identical methodology (Cooper et al., 2011). This suggests that the mixed results in 
the dot probe literature may also be in part due to other issues, such as poor reliability (as 
proposed by Cooper et al., 2011). 
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1.1.3 Emotional Cueing Paradigm 
 In this paradigm, developed by Fox, Russo, Bowles, and Dutton (2001), participants are 
presented with a display that includes a single cue (e.g., a word, image, or face) to the left or 
right of fixation. The cue can be threatening (e.g., a threatening word or angry face) or neutral 
(e.g., a neutral word or calm face). After a short interval, a target appears either to the left or 
right of fixation. (See Figure 2 for an illustration). In a congruent trial, the target appears in the 
location previously occupied by the cue. In an incongruent trial, the target appears in the 
opposite location. Again, participants are asked to respond as quickly and accurately as possible 
to the target on some dimension (e.g., location or identity). A congruency (cueing) score can be 
computed for each emotion by subtracting mean RTs on congruent trials from mean RTs on 
incongruent trials. This is not typically interpreted as an attentional bias score, as it does not 
reflect changes in attention across emotions. Instead, it simply reflects differences in RTs 
between incongruent and congruent trials. In the emotional cueing paradigm, an overall bias 
score is computed using the difference between the congruency effects for threat and neutral 
trials. In addition, faster responses on congruent threat-cued trials relative to congruent neutral-
cued trials are interpreted as a facilitation bias toward threat. Slower responses on incongruent 
threat-cued trials relative to incongruent neutral-cued trials are interpreted as a disengagement 
bias (difficulity disengaging) from threat.  
The emotional cueing paradigm has also produced evidence for ABT in anxious 
participants (e.g., Yiend & Mathews, 2001; Mogg, Holmes, Garner, & Bradley, 2008). 
Specifically, a number of studies have demonstrated difficulty disengaging from threat in high 
trait anxious individuals (Fox, Russo, & Dutton, 2002, Experiment 1; Yiend & Mathews, 2001), 
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whereas other studies with high trait anxious individuals have found both facilitated attention 
and delayed disengagement (e.g., Van Damme, Crombez, Hermans, Koster, & Eccleston, 2006; 
Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, Van Damme, and Wiersema (2006) with highly threatening cues. 
In their meta-analysis, Bar-Haim et al. (2007) found significant threat-related biases for anxious 
participants using a within-participant analysis in the emotional cueing paradigm. The between-
groups effect (comparing high anxious and low anxious participants) did not reach significance, 
but this analysis was based on only four studies.  
Less is known about moderating factors in the emotional cueing paradigm compared with 
the dot probe paradigm, chiefly because there are fewer studies using emotional cueing (Bar-
Haim et al., 2007).  
As with the dot probe paradigm, a few studies using the emotional cueing paradigm have 
failed to find significant anxiety-related ABT (e.g., Broomfield & Turpin, 2005; Koster, Leyman, 
De Raedt, & Crombez, 2006). As discussed by Cooper, Rowe, Penton-Voak, and Ludwig (2009), 
poor reliability may also contribute to the mixed and null results in the emotional cueing 
literature. 
1.1.4 Psychometric Properties of ABT Measures 
1.1.4.1 Reliability 
Reliability refers to the proportion of a measure’s variance that reflects true score variance, 
rather than measurement error. A measure’s reliability can be estimated in a number of ways, 
including split-half reliability and internal consistency reliability (e.g., Sattler, 2008). Split-half 
reliability reflects the extent to which a participant’s score on one half of a measure predicts his 
or her score on the second half of the measure. A related but somewhat more stable measure, 
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internal consistency reliability, reflects the extent to which different items on the same test 
correlate with each other. Internal consistency reliability is often measured using Cronbach’s 
alpha, which is mathematically equivalent to the average of all possible split halves.  
Evaluating reliability is a crucial step in the development of measures in psychology. Low 
reliability can decrease statistical power to detect correlations between measures and differences 
between groups (see Kopriva & Shaw, 1991). If measures of ABT have low reliability, this may 
in part explain some of the null and contradictory findings in the ABT literature. Although there 
is no strict rule for what level of reliability is acceptable, reliability values below .60 are typically 
considered very low or unacceptable (Murphy & Davidshofer, 2005; Sattler, 2008). Values 
above .70 are considered moderate, and values above .90 are considered high or excellent 
(Murphy & Davidshofer, 2005; Sattler, 2008).  
1.1.4.2 Reliability of response time measures 
Traditional response time (RT) research examines the effect of experimental manipulations 
by comparing RTs across two or more conditions. Researchers typically report the mean RT by 
condition as the main dependent variable, although difference scores in RTs between conditions 
are also sometimes used. Unfortunately, the reliabilities of RT measures often remain unassessed 
and unreported in traditional RT research (see Stolz, Besner, & Carr, 2005 for a discussion of 
this issue). 
Over the past two decades, however, a small subset of RT researchers have taken an interest 
in the reliability of RT measures, and a handful of studies on the reliability of RT effects have 
been published in the cognitive psychology and clinical psychology literatures. These studies 
generally show acceptable to excellent reliabilities for raw RTs (e.g., all estimates above .8 in 
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Waechter et al., 2014; all estimates above .7 in Eide, Kemp, Silberstein, Nathan, & Stough, 
2002). For RT difference scores, however, studies show both low reliabilities (near 0 for 
emotional Stroop scores in Eide et al., 2002; below .60 for Alerting and Orienting indices from 
the ANT: MacLeod et al., 2010; below .60 for two versions of the Numerical Distance effect: 
Maloney, Risko, Preston, Ansari, & Fugelsang, 2010) and acceptable reliabilities (Spearman-
Brown corrected reliabilities of .70 for semantic priming effects in Waechter et al., 2014; 
corrected reliability of .81 for the Executive Control index from the ANT: MacLeod et al., 2010). 
Thus, while raw RTs are typically very reliable, the reliability estimates for RT difference scores 
are more variable and can be unacceptably low. 
A recent study by Miller and Ulrich (2013) uses a model based on classical test theory to 
examine the factors that affect the reliability of RTs and RT difference scores. Miller and Ulrich 
(2013) demonstrate that the reliability of raw RTs depends strongly on the number of trials per 
subject and condition; however, the minimum number of trials for acceptable reliability is not 
high. In fact, the reliabilities of RT measures are generally higher than .85 with even 10–20 trials 
per participant. RT variability also has an effect on the reliability of RTs; similarly, though, the 
impact of within-condition RT variability on reliability becomes less strong as the number of 
trials increases, such that RT variability generally only has a substantial impact with fewer than 
20-30 trials per participant and condition. The authors also examined the impact of participants’ 
general processing time (G), their processing time for the particular task at hand (Δ), and their 
residual sensory-motor processing times (R, which reflects factors such as light transduction 
processes in the retina and the movement of muscle fibers in the hand for a key press) on RT 
reliability. They found that more variability across participants on G, Δ, and R results in higher 
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reliability, which is consistent with the Classical Test Theory principle that reliability increases 
with the amount of true score variance. That said, as long as there is sufficient variation on at 
least one of G, Δ, and R, raw RTs tend to be reliable (Miller & Ulrich, 2013). Finally, Miller and 
Ulrich (2013) demonstrate that the reliability of raw RTs is relatively independent of task 
difficulty. These conclusions are consistent with the pattern observed above from the empirical 
literature: Except in unusual circumstances (e.g., with very few trials or highly limited variability 
in participant processing times), raw RTs are quite reliable. 
Miller and Ulrich (2013) also examine factors that affect the reliability of RT difference 
scores. Again, the number of trials has a strong effect. Unlike with the raw RTs, 10 trials are 
typically not sufficient to attain high reliability with difference scores. In fact, in some cases 
(depending on the factors discussed next), hundreds of trials per participant and condition are 
needed to exceed a reliability of .80. Miller and Ulrich (2013) also demonstrate that reliability 
increases with larger effects. Increases in the time taken for both perceptual input and motor 
output actually decrease reliability, largely by increasing trial-to-trial error variance. Similarly, 
within-condition RT variability also decreases reliability. Increases in G and Δ typically have 
small positive effects on reliability.  
Finally, Miller and Ulrich (2013) note that reliabilities are higher when the difference scores 
are taken from opposing task processes rather than from common task processes. For example, 
traditional (non-emotional) Stroop and cueing effects, as well as the flanker effect, result from 
opposing task processes. With opposing task processes, task-specific processing times for the 
two conditions that make up the difference score are strongly negatively correlated. This occurs 
when the hypothesized process underlying the difference score has opposing effects on the two 
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task-specific processing times. For example, with the Stroop effect, the difference in RTs 
between incongruent and congruent trials is thought to represent the effect of automatic word 
reading. When word reading is more automatic, task-specific processing times for congruent 
trials decrease and task-specific processing times for incongruent trials increase (Miller & 
Ulrich, 2013); thus, these are opposing task processes. Conversely, reliabilities are lower when 
the difference scores are taken from common task processes. With common task processes, task-
specific processing times for the two conditions are strongly positively correlated. Miller and 
Ulrich (2013) use the example of the difference between mental rotation scores when rotating 
objects 180 degrees versus 90 degrees. In this case, the difference between the two conditions 
simply reflects efficiency at mental rotation, and the task-specific processing times are positively 
correlated. In the case of unrelated task processes, in which the task-specific processing times by 
condition are not theoretically correlated either positively or negatively with each other, 
reliabilities tend to be intermediate.  
Miller and Ulrich’s model (2013) clearly demonstrates that the reliabilities of RT difference 
scores are affected by various factors and can vary widely. The factors that impact the reliability 
of difference scores include the number of trials, the size of effects, the within-condition RT 
variability, the variability in G and Δ, and the type of task process (opposing or common). Miller 
and Ulrich’s (2013) findings help to clarify and explain the empirical literature discussed above, 
which shows that some RT difference scores have acceptable reliability and that some have very 
low reliability. Next, the literature specifically examining the reliability of bias scores from dot 
probe tasks and emotional cueing tasks is reviewed. 
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1.1.4.3 Reliability of dot probe bias scores  
Over the past decade, a handful of studies on the reliability of dot probe bias scores have 
been published. Schmukle (2005) and Staugaard (2009) evaluated the reliability of dot probe bias 
scores using words and face images, respectively, with university student volunteers. Unlike in 
most ABT studies, these students were not pre-selected for particular levels of trait anxiety. Both 
Schmukle (2005) and Staugaard (2009) found that the reliabilities of the bias scores were 
extremely low. In fact, a number of the estimates were negative and the highest reliability 
estimate from either study was .32 (Schmukle, 2005). Van Bockstaele and colleagues (2011), 
Cooper and colleagues (2011), and Waechter et al. (2014) found similarly low reliabilities for dot 
probe bias scores. In a recent study with children as participants, Brown et al. (2014) also found 
unacceptably low reliabilities for these bias scores (rs < .29).  
 Two studies, however, have found somewhat higher reliabilities for bias scores using dot 
probe tasks. Bar-Haim et al. (2010) assessed the reliability of bias scores with participants living 
under war-related threat near the Gaza Strip in early 2009. The ABT analysis revealed a bias 
away from threat in the high-risk groups. The authors reported a split-half reliability of r = .45, 
which translates to an acceptable Spearman-Brown corrected reliability of .62. In another study, 
Enock, Hofmann, and McNally (2014) asked participants to complete three sessions per day of 
Attentional Bias Modification (ABM) training for 28 days. The active ABM training was 
designed to teach participants to attend to neutral rather than threat faces. The training paradigm 
was similar to the dot probe task, except that in the active training condition the target always 
appeared in the location of the neutral face (i.e., all incongruent trials). As a result, the best 
strategy for fast responding was to attend to the neutral face on each trial. The researchers also 
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included a control training condition, in which participants completed a traditional dot probe task 
(half congruent and half incongruent trials) three times a day. ABT was assessed with a 
traditional dot probe task once a week, and the reliability of these bias scores was examined. 
Enock and colleagues (2014) found that both groups had very unreliable (near 0) dot probe bias 
scores initially and in the first week of ABM. However, the reliability of the bias scores 
increased for both groups as the training continued. At week 4 for the active ABM group, the 
Spearman-Brown corrected reliability of the bias score was .53.  
 Although the majority of studies have shown that dot probe bias scores have very low 
reliability, the results of Bar-Haim et al. (2010) and Enock et al. (2014) are promising in that 
they provide empirical evidence that dot probe scores can be at least somewhat more reliable in 
certain contexts. Unfortunately, it is not clear from the current literature precisely what those 
contexts are. Scores may become more reliable after daily repetition of the dot probe task for 
several weeks (Enock et al., 2014); this repetition is of course not feasible for most ABT studies, 
which typically take place in a single session.  
1.1.4.4 Reliability of emotional cueing bias scores 
Very little is known about the reliability of emotional cueing bias scores. Only one 
published paper (Enock et al., 2014) has examined this question, and that was in the context of 
an ABM training study. Enock et al. (2014) found Spearman-Brown corrected reliabilities near 0 
(-.22 and -.04) for emotional cueing overall bias scores, suggesting that the reliability of these 
scores is unacceptably low. No study has yet examined the reliability of facilitation and 
disengagement bias scores in the emotional cueing task.  
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1.1.4.5 Summary of reliability data 
In sum, the reliability of dot probe bias scores is generally very poor, and the reliability of 
emotional cueing bias scores is largely unknown. Other RT measures of ABT do not fare much 
better—the reliabilities of emotional Stroop bias scores (e.g., Eide et al., 2002; Brown et al., 
2014) and visual search bias scores (Brown et al., 2014) are also very low, and the reliability of 
ABT measures from the attentional blink task is unknown. Using measures with low reliability in 
ABT research is problematic in that it (a) reduces power to detect correlations and group 
differences (e.g., Kopriva & Shaw, 1991); (b) contributes to inconsistencies in the literature (e.g., 
Cooper et al., 2011); and (c) impedes progress in our understanding of ABT and their association 
with anxiety disorders (see Van Bockstaele et al., 2014).  
1.1.4.6 Validity  
Validity refers to the extent to which a test measures the construct that it is intended to 
measure. That is, to what extent do biases from the dot probe and emotional cueing paradigm 
actually index ABT? The current study examines evidence for the convergent validity of ABT 
scores from these two tasks. If dot probe and emotional cueing scores index the same construct 
(ABT), they should in theory be strongly correlated.  
To date, there is limited evidence for convergent validity between different measures of 
ABT in the literature. A few studies have investigated correlations between individuals’ dot 
probe and emotional Stroop bias scores. These studies have revealed either no correlation 
(Dalgleish et al., 2003; Mogg et al., 2000; Gotlib et al., 2004) or modest correlations (Brosschot, 
de Ruiter, & Kindt, 1999; Egloff & Hock, 2003). Because of the lack of strong correlations 
between measures, these results are typically interpreted as evidence that the dot probe and 
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emotional Stroop tasks index separate processes. No published study has yet examined the 
correlation between dot probe and emotional cueing scores, despite their similar use in indexing 
biases in spatial attention. 
Notably, Miller and Ulrich (2013) urge caution in the interpretation of correlations 
involving RTs and difference scores. First, correlations between difference scores are limited by 
the reliability of the difference scores; two measures will not correlate if they are unreliable. 
Second, Miller and Ulrich’s (2013) model shows that correlations involving RT difference scores 
are influenced by numerous factors and that the observable correlation between two RT 
difference scores is often a poor reflection of their true coherence. That is, the observed 
correlation between two ABT measures does not necessarily reflect the extent to which they are 
both measuring the same process (e.g., ABT). Although the present work uses correlations to 
examine the convergent validity of dot probe and emotional cueing tasks, the results of these 
analyses should be interpreted with caution in light of Miller and Ulrich’s findings.  
 
 
 
 
 15 
Chapter 2 
Psychometric Properties of a Dot Probe and  
an Emotional Cueing Task 
2.1 Study 1 Introduction 
A review of the literature showed that the reliabilities of RT measures of ABT are either 
largely unknown (e.g., emotional cueing bias scores) or unacceptably low (e.g., dot probe bias 
scores). If ABT indices with low reliability continue to be used in research, then progress in 
understanding the role of ABT in anxiety, anxiety disorders, and anxiety interventions will be 
necessarily limited. The purpose of Study 1 is to examine the psychometric properties of two of 
the most common measures of spatial ABT. In doing so, some limitations of the existing 
literature will be addressed.  
First, when the dot probe and emotional cueing measures are used in the anxiety 
literature, participants are typically recruited based on high and low trait anxiety scores (e.g., 
Mogg & Bradley, 1999; Fox et al., 2001). No study has yet examined the reliability of dot probe 
or emotional cueing measures with participants recruited for high and low trait anxiety. 
Recruiting participants with a wide range of anxiety levels (and therefore presumably a wide 
range of attentional bias scores) may be especially important because a wider range of measured 
true scores typically results in higher measured reliability (e.g., Horwitz & Horwitz, 2012).  
A second limitation of the existing literature is how little is known about the reliability of 
emotional cueing scores. Only one recently published study has examined this question (Enock 
et al., 2014), and this study looked only at the reliability of the overall emotional cueing scores. 
Thus, the current study is the first to examine the reliability of facilitation and disengagement 
bias scores from the emotional cueing task. 
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Third, no other study has computed the convergent validity of dot probe and emotional 
cueing bias scores.  
Study 1 examines the following: (1) the reliability of dot probe and emotional cueing bias 
scores; and (2) whether individuals’ ABT scores are consistent across dot probe and emotional 
cueing tasks. In Study 1, the dot probe and emotional cueing task procedures were modelled after 
procedures that have produced significant ABT in previous research (Bradley, Mogg, Falla, & 
Hamilton, 1998 for the dot probe task; Mogg, Holmes, Garner, & Bradley, 2008 for the 
emotional cueing task). Because one of the questions of interest in this study was the extent to 
which the two paradigms measure the same construct, some modifications were implemented to 
make the procedures for the two tasks as similar as possible. Specifically, the timing parameters, 
display parameters, response options, and number of trials were set to be identical for the two 
tasks.  
Finally, although Bradley et al. (1998) and Mogg et al. (2008) used angry faces as their 
threat stimuli, fear faces were also added to Study 1. With this addition, the reliability of biases 
toward fear faces (e.g., Fox, 2002) can also be examined. 
2.2 Method 
2.2.1 Participants 
A large sample of undergraduate students from the University of Waterloo completed the 
State-Trait Inventory of Cognitive and Somatic Anxiety (STICSA; Ree, French, MacLeod, & 
Locke, 2008; trait version only) as part of a Mass Testing session between 2 and 8 weeks before 
the Study session. Participants scoring in the bottom 20% (STICSA score below 28) and top 20% 
(STICSA score above 44) were eligible to participate in the current study.  
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One hundred fifty-eight students (114 female; 44 male) participated in the study in 
exchange for course credit. The mean age of participants was 19.85 years. Participants identified 
primarily as Asian (36.7%) and White (34.8%). Other groups represented in the sample included 
East Indian (7.0%), Biracial (5.7%), West Indian (4.4%), Middle Eastern (3.8%), Black (1.9%), 
First Nations (0.6%) and Other (3.2%). Three participants (1.9%) chose not to disclose their race. 
2.2.2 Measures and Materials 
2.2.2.1 Computer Task Materials 
Images of 32 actors from the NimStim Face Stimulus Set (Tottenham et al., 2009) were 
used. Each actor portrayed the following closed-mouth expressions: Anger, Fear, Happiness, 
Calm, and Neutral. Figure 3 shows sample images for each emotion.  
2.2.2.2 State-Trait Inventory of Cognitive and Somatic Anxiety 
The STICSA consists of a state version and a trait version. Each version is a 21-item 
measure of cognitive and somatic symptoms of anxiety with items rated on a 4-point Likert 
scale. Cronbach’s alphas in a validation study were .91 for the trait scale and .92 for the state 
scale (Grös, Antony, Simms, & McCabe, 2007).  
2.2.2.3 Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale (DASS-21; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) 
The DASS-21 is a 21-item measure with three 7-item subscales: Depression, Anxiety, 
and Stress. Items are rated on a 4-point Likert scale. Cronbach’s alphas in a validation study 
were .94 for the Depression Subscale, .87 for the Anxiety Subscale, and .91 for the Stress 
subscale (Antony, Bieling, Cox, Enns, & Swinson, 1998). The DASS was included to 
differentiate any trait anxiety-related biases from biases associated with depression symptoms. 
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2.2.2.4 Social Desirability Scale Version XX (SDS; Strahan & Gerbasi, 1972) 
The SDS is a 20-item measure of the tendency to give socially desirable responses. 
Cronbach’s alpha in a validation study was .87 (Fischer & Fick, 1993). The SDS was included 
because high social desirability can confound measures of anxiety and attentional bias (e.g., Fox, 
1993). 
2.2.3 Procedure 
These procedures were reviewed and approved by the University of Waterloo’s Office of 
Research Ethics. After arriving at the lab and providing informed consent, participants completed 
the dot probe task and the emotional cueing task in counterbalanced order. They then completed 
the battery of questionnaires described above.  
2.2.3.1 Dot probe task 
For the dot probe task, each of the emotion images (one Anger, one Fear, one Happy, and 
one Calm or Neutral) for each of the 32 actors was paired with a Calm or Neutral image, 
resulting in 128 pairs. The location of the emotional face and the location of the target were 
counterbalanced across participants. Each participant saw each pair of faces once in Block 1 and 
once in Block 2, for a total of 256 trials. Participants completed Block 1, took a self-paced break, 
and then completed Block 2. Trials were presented in randomized order within blocks. Twelve 
practice trials (3 trials for each emotion) were created using additional images.  
On each trial, participants saw a white fixation cross in the center of a black screen (see 
Figure 1). The fixation cross remained on the screen throughout the trial. After 500 ms, two faces 
appeared (one left of fixation, one right of fixation). The face images measured 7 cm wide by 9.5 
cm tall. The closest or inner edge of each image appeared 1.0 degrees of visual angle from the 
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center of the screen. The faces remained on the screen for 500 ms, followed by a 50 ms display 
with only the fixation cross on the screen. Then a white target symbol (: or .. in size 16 Calibri 
font) appeared 5.3 degrees of visual angle to the left or right of the centre of the screen. 
Participants were instructed to identify the target by pressing the “m” key (labelled with a .. 
sticker) or the “k” key (labelled with a : sticker) as quickly and accurately as possible on a 
standard keyboard. The target remained on the screen until a response was made.  
2.2.3.2 Emotional cueing task 
The cue faces consisted of one emotion image for each of the 32 actors (one Anger, one 
Fear, one Happy, and one Calm or one Neutral). The location of the emotional face (left or right) 
and the location of the target (left or right) were again counterbalanced across participants. Each 
participant saw each face once in Block 1 and once in Block 2, for a total of 256 trials. Again, 
trials were presented in randomized order within blocks. Twelve practice trials (3 trials for each 
emotion) were created using additional NimStim images.  
Participants first saw a white fixation cross in the center of a black screen, flanked by two 
white rectangular boxes measuring 7.5 cm wide by 10 cm tall (see Figure 2). The fixation cross 
and the boxes remained on the screen throughout the trial. The centre of the images appeared 5.3 
degrees of visual angle from the center of the screen. After 500 ms, a single face (7 cm wide by 
9.5 cm tall) appeared in one of the boxes. The face remained on the screen for 500 ms, followed 
by a 50 ms display with only the fixation cross and boxes on the screen. Then a white target 
symbol (: or .. in size 16 Calibri font) appeared in the centre of one of the boxes, 5.3 degrees of 
visual angle from the centre of the screen. Participants identified the target using a key press as 
in the dot probe task. The target remained on the screen until a response was made.  
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2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Anxiety Groups 
 Participants were divided into groups based on their trait anxiety (STICSA) scores at the 
testing session. Participants whose STICSA Trait scores varied between the testing session and 
the in-lab session to the extent that they switched groups (participants with scores below 27 on 
the screening session and above 45 on the in-lab session, or vice-versa) were identified (n = 2). 
To ensure stable and accurate measurement of trait anxiety, these participants were excluded 
from analysis. Two groups were created based on the median in-lab STICSA Trait score (38). 
The groups consisted of 79 participants (low trait anxiety; LTA) and 77 participants (high trait 
anxiety; HTA), respectively.  
 A small amount of questionnaire data (<1.0%) was missing. These missing data were 
replaced using Expectation-Maximization imputation (Dempster, Laird, & Rubin, 1977). 
Demographics and questionnaire scores for the two groups are presented in Table 1. The HTA 
group was significantly older than the LTA group (see Table 1), but the groups did not differ on 
sex. The groups differed as expected on trait and state anxiety (STICSA), depression, anxiety, 
and stress symptoms (DASS), and social desirability scores (SDS).  
As in Mogg and Bradley (1999), Social Desirability Scale (SDS) scores were examined 
for unusually large values. The box-and-whisker plot did not identify any outliers, and when 
SDS scores were transformed to z-scores no value was above 2.5. Thus, no participants were 
excluded for scoring unusually high on social desirability.  
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2.3.2 Dot Probe Results 
 Response time (RT) analyses were conducted for experimental trials in which an accurate 
response was given. Two participants (one from each group) had fewer than 75% accurate 
responses (M = .51 and M = .73) and were excluded from the dot probe RT analyses. The other 
participants’ responses were very accurate (M = .946). As is typical in the ABT response time 
literature, error rates and trials with errors were not analyzed further.  
To identify outliers, a non-recursive method was used that adjusted the cut-off criterion 
depending on the sample size for each participant and condition (Van Selst & Jolicoeur, 1994). 
This method was chosen over the box and whisker procedure for the RTs (e.g., Mogg & Bradley, 
1999), in which all RTs more extreme than a particular value are identified (regardless of 
participant and condition) for two reasons: (1) outlier procedures with hard cut-offs typically 
identify a disproportionate amount of outliers in the fastest and slowest conditions, which may 
artificially attenuate real effects in RT (see Van Selst & Jolicoeur, 1994); and (2) with hard cut-
off procedures, the sample size highly influences what the mean value will be after outliers are 
removed (Miller, 1991). The Van Selst and Jolicoeur (1994) procedure was developed to address 
these concerns. For the dot probe task, outliers made up 2.88% of correct RT data and were 
excluded from analysis
1
.  
 A 2 (Anxiety Group: HTA vs. LTA) X 3 (Emotion: Angry vs. Fear vs. Happy) X 2 
(Congruency: Incongruent vs. Congruent) mixed ANOVA was conducted on the RT data. In a 
congruent trial, the target followed the faces in the location of the emotional face; in an 
incongruent trial, the target followed the faces in the location of the neutral face. Table 2 presents 
                                                     
1
 When these data were analysed using an alternate hard cut-off outlier procedure, the ABT results were similar and 
the reliability estimates were similar or lower. 
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the RT data. For this and all subsequent ANOVAs, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected estimates were 
used when necessary (i.e., when assumptions of sphericity were violated). There were no 
significant effects of Anxiety Group: F (1, 152) = 1.11, MSE = 55908.28, p = .294, Emotion: F 
(1.81, 275.7) = .077, MSE = 991.02, p = .910, or Congruency: F (1, 152) = 1.18, MSE = 550.93, 
p = .280. There were no interactions, Fs < 1.6, ps > .20. Thus, the ANOVA revealed no evidence 
of anxiety-related ABTs. 
Next, bias scores were computed. First, traditional dot probe bias scores were computed 
for each emotion by subtracting the mean RT on congruent trials from the mean RT on 
incongruent trials. Then, a facilitated bias score was calculated by subtracting the mean RT from 
congruent trials from the mean RT on neutral-neutral trials (Koster et al., 2004). A 
disengagement bias score was computed by subtracting the mean RT from neutral-neutral trials 
from the mean RT on incongruent trials (Koster et al., 2004). T-tests were computed comparing 
bias scores for each group and emotion to 0 (see Table 3). There were no significant biases. 
 Correlations between the bias scores and the questionnaire measures were also computed. 
The results are presented in Table 4. There were no significant correlations with STICSA scores. 
There were small but significant correlations between SDS scores and both overall (r (154) = 
.22, p < .01) and disengage (r (154) = .17, p < .05) bias scores for angry faces.  
2.3.2.1 Dot probe reliability 
To estimate the reliability of the bias scores, a permutation approach was used (e.g., 
MacLeod et al., 2010; Enock et al., 2014). The data were split into two random halves 1000 
times using R (R Development Core Team, 2009). For each of these 1000 permutations, the dot 
probe bias score was calculated for each participant for Half 1 and Half 2, and these scores were 
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correlated. The reliability estimate was obtained by averaging the 1000 correlations, and the 
estimate was subsequently corrected for test length using the Spearman-Brown prophecy 
formula. This approach was used because single split-half reliabilities tend to produce unstable 
estimates (e.g., Enock et al., 2014), and because traditional reliability estimates like Cronbach’s 
alpha cannot be applied to difference scores in a straightforward way. 
Table 5 presents the mean reliability estimates based on the 1000 permutations, 95% 
confidence intervals based on Fischer’s r-to-z transformation, and Spearman-Brown corrected 
reliability estimates for each bias score. Note that negative reliability estimates are theoretically 
impossible and are considered misestimates of 0. The corrected reliability estimates ranged from 
0 to .50, all of which were below acceptable levels of reliability. 
2.3.3 Emotional Cueing Results 
 Data from five participants were excluded from the emotional cueing analyses for low 
accuracy (< 75% correct trials). The remaining participants were generally accurate (M = .937). 
Inaccurate trials were excluded from the RT analyses. The same non-recursive method adjusting 
the cut-off criterion by sample size was used for identifying outliers (Van Selst & Jolicoeur, 
1994). Outliers made up 2.79% of correct RT data and were excluded from analysis.  
A 2 (Anxiety Group: HTA vs. LTA) X 4 (Emotion: Angry vs. Fear vs. Happy vs. 
Neutral) X 2 (Congruency: Incongruent vs. Congruent) mixed ANOVA was conducted on the 
RT data. In a congruent trial, the target appeared in the location previously occupied by the face 
cue; in an incongruent trial, the target appeared in the opposite location. Table 2 presents RTs by 
condition. There were no significant effects of Anxiety Group: F (1, 149) = .831, MSE = 
40374.71, p = .363, Emotion: F (2.85, 424.21) = .419, MSE = 991.02, p = .729, or Congruency: 
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F (1, 149) = .689, MSE = 924.63, p = .408. There were no interactions, Fs < 1, ps > .40. Thus, 
the ANOVA revealed no evidence of anxiety-related ABTs. 
Next, three bias indices were calculated for the emotional cueing task (e.g., Koster et al., 
2006a): an overall bias, computed by subtracting the congruency effect for neutral trials from the 
congruency effect for emotional trials; a facilitation bias, computed by subtracting mean RTs for 
congruent emotional trials from mean RTs for congruent neutral trials; and a disengagement bias, 
computed by subtracting mean RTs for incongruent neutral trials from mean RTs for incongruent 
emotional trials. Planned t-tests were conducted comparing these bias scores to 0 for each group 
and emotion. There were no significant biases (see Table 3). 
 Correlations between the bias indices and the questionnaire data are presented in Table 5. 
The angry bias was negatively correlated with state anxiety scores (r (151) = -.17, p < .05) only. 
2.3.3.1 Emotional cueing reliability 
Table 5 presents the reliabilities for the difference scores (congruency effects, overall 
biases, facilitation biases, and disengage biases) from the emotional cueing paradigm. All 
corrected reliability estimates for the bias scores were low, ranging from 0 to .43. Even the 
congruency scores (which are not a measure of bias but rather measure differences in RTs 
between incongruent and congruent cues) showed low reliability, ranging from .17 to .44. 
2.3.4 Between Task Correlations 
To determine whether bias scores on the two tasks were related, Pearson’s correlations 
were computed between bias scores on the dot probe and emotional cueing tasks for each 
emotion. There were no significant correlations, ps > .05. 
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2.4 Discussion 
2.4.1 Reliability 
In Study 1, the reliability estimates for dot probe bias scores ranged from 0 to .43, and the 
reliability estimates for emotional cueing bias scores ranged from 0 to .50. When only the 
estimates for angry and fear trials (as opposed to happy trials, which do not measure biases to 
threat) are examined, these estimates ranged from .11 to .50 in the dot probe task and from 0 to 
.43 in the emotional cueing task. In addition, many of the 95% confidence intervals around the 
reliability estimates overlapped with 0. Thus, the results of this study are consistent with 
previous findings that dot probe bias scores have unacceptably low reliability (e.g., Schmukle, 
2005; Staugaard, 2009; Waechter et al., 2014). This study is also among the first to examine the 
reliability of emotional cueing bias scores. Although one published study (Enock et al., 2014) 
included a reliability analysis for overall bias scores for the emotional cueing task, this is the first 
study to examine the reliability of the facilitation and disengagement bias scores from this task. 
The current results suggest that the facilitation and disengagement bias scores from the 
emotional cueing task also have unacceptably low reliability. 
HTA and LTA participants were selected for this study based on the hypothesis that more 
variation in trait anxiety might lead in turn to more variation in ABT scores, which should 
improve reliability (e.g., Horwitz & Horwitz, 2012). As discussed above, however, the observed 
reliability estimates from the current study were in the unacceptable range and not substantially 
higher than other estimates in the literature (e.g., Staugaard, 2009). Therefore, the selection of 
HTA and LTA participants likely had no effect on the reliability of ABT scores. 
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2.4.2 ABT and Response Times 
The current study failed to find significant attentional biases. The HTA participants did 
not show ABT in either the dot probe or the emotional cueing task. There was a significant 
correlation between state anxiety scores and the emotional cueing bias for angry faces, but this 
correlation was not in the expected direction and thus does not reflect anxiety-related ABT.  
It is unclear why the current study failed to replicate the biases found in many dot probe 
and emotional cueing studies (e.g., as reviewed by Bar-Haim et al., 2007); however, some other 
studies have also failed to find significant ABT in anxious populations (e.g., Bradley et al., 1997; 
Mogg et al., 2000). In the literature, these null and mixed results are typically attributed to 
methodological differences between studies. It is possible that the methodological changes made 
to two tasks (e.g., the addition of fear faces; addition of more trials; changes to the timing 
parameters and the display sizes in order to make the two tasks as similar as possible) may have 
resulted in the observed null findings. Alternately, the low reliability of the measures may 
contribute to these null findings, as reliability affects power to detect differences between groups 
(Kopriva & Shaw, 1991).  
Notably, Study 1 failed to find an overall congruency (cueing) effect in the emotional 
cueing task. Typically in emotional cueing studies, participants respond more quickly to 
congruent trials compared to incongruent trials (but see Broomfield & Turpin, 2005, for the 
opposite pattern). In the case of Study 1, the lack of a congruency effect was likely due to the 
relatively long stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA; 550 ms) between the cue and the target. Cueing 
effects in response to peripheral cues (such as those in Study 1) are most robust at relatively 
short SOAs. For example, Muller and Rabbitt (1989) examined participants’ accuracy on valid 
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trials with both peripheral and central cues in a standard Posner cueing paradigm. They found 
that responses to peripheral cues showed a fast rise in accuracy that peaked at the 175 ms SOA—
much shorter than the 550 ms SOA used in Study 1. In the existing literature, the emotional 
cueing paradigm typically involves SOAs of 150-300 ms (Fox et al., 2001; Mogg et al., 2001) 
although SOAs of up to 500 ms have also been used (Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, Van 
Damme, & Wiersema, 2006). Like the congruency effect, ABT in the emotional cueing task may 
also be more readily found with a shorter SOA after the onset of the emotional face.  
2.4.3 Convergent Validity 
Despite the clear methodological similarities between the two tasks, the bias scores 
resulting from the dot probe and emotional cueing tasks were unrelated. It is likely that the 
correlations between tasks were limited (at least to some extent) by the poor reliability of the bias 
scores or by other factors that affect these correlations (see Miller & Ulrich, 2013). Alternatively, 
despite the fact that the two tasks in Study 1 used very similar displays, identical timing 
parameters, and that both the dot probe and emotional cueing tasks putatively measure ABT, the 
two bias scores may not actually be indexing the same processes. 
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Chapter 3 
Psychometric Properties of Measures of Early ABT 
3.1 Study 2 Introduction 
Study 1 examined the reliability and convergent validity of dot probe and emotional 
cueing bias scores. Consistent with previous research, the results showed unacceptably low 
reliability for dot probe bias scores. This study was also among the first to examine the 
reliabilities of emotional cueing scores, which were also unacceptably low in Study 1. 
Importantly, Study 1 failed to replicate the typical congruency (cueing) effect in the 
emotional cueing task. The lack of congruency effect was likely due to the atypically long SOA 
between the onset of the face cues and the targets in Study 1. In an attempt to obtain the 
congruency effect seen in previous research, Study 2 is identical to Study 1 but uses an SOA of 
150 ms. 
The shorter SOA in Study 2 also allows for the investigation of the psychometric 
properties of early attention to threat. In typical dot probe and emotional cueing tasks, 
information about attention is captured only at a single time point. With the 500 ms SOA, for 
example, bias scores are intended to capture attention to threatening information 500 ms after the 
threat onset. To date, a number of studies have used multiple SOAs to better understand the time 
course of attention to threat in both unselected and anxious participants (e.g., Mogg, Bradley, De 
Bono, & Painter, 1997; Cooper & Langton, 2006; Fox, Russo, & Dutton, 2002; Koster, 
Verschuere, Crombez, & Van Damme, 2005), with some interesting results. For example, using 
a dot probe task, Cooper and Langton (2006) found an attentional bias to angry faces with a 100 
 29 
ms SOA. With a 500 ms SOA, they found a negative attentional bias, which can be interpreted as 
the avoidance of angry faces (Cooper & Langton, 2006).  
Study 2 will allow for better understanding of the psychometric properties of measures of 
early attention (i.e., 150 ms after threat onset) to threat. 
3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Participants 
The recruitment procedures were identical to Study 1. No individuals who had completed 
Study 1 were permitted to participate in Study 2.  
One hundred twelve undergraduate students (86 female; 26 male) participated in 
exchange for credit in a psychology course. The mean age of participants was 20.40 years. 
Participants identified primarily as Asian (48.2%) and White (30.4%). Other groups represented 
in the sample included East Indian (7.1%), Biracial (7.1%), West Indian (2.7%), Middle Eastern 
(2.7%), and Other (0.9%). One participant (0.9%) chose not to disclose her race. 
3.2.2 Measures and Materials 
 The measures and materials used were identical to those used in Study 1. 
3.2.3 Procedure 
 The procedure was identical to Study 1 with one exception. In the computer tasks, the cue 
stimuli (two faces for the dot probe task; one face for the emotional cueing task) appeared for 
100 ms rather than 500 ms. 
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3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Anxiety Groups 
 Participants were again divided into groups based on their trait anxiety (STICSA) scores 
at the testing session. Participants whose STICSA Trait scores varied between the testing session 
and the in-lab session to the extent that they switched groups (participants with scores below 27 
on the screening session and above 45 on the in-lab session, or vice-versa) were identified (n = 
3). To ensure stable and accurate measurement of trait anxiety, these participants were excluded 
from analysis. Two groups were created based on the median in-lab STICSA Trait score (37). 
The groups consisted of 54 participants (LTA) and 55 participants (HTA), respectively.  
 A small amount of questionnaire data (<1.0%) was missing; these missing data were 
replaced using Expectation-Maximization imputation. Demographics and questionnaire scores 
for the two groups are presented in Table 6. The groups did not differ on age or sex, but differed 
as expected on trait and state anxiety (STICSA), depression, anxiety, and stress symptoms 
(DASS), and social desirability scores (SDS).  
As in Mogg and Bradley (1999), Social Desirability Scale (SDS) scores were examined 
for unusually large values. The box-and-whisker plot identified one outlier with a score of 20. 
When SDS scores were transformed to z-scores, this participant’s z-score was greater than 2.5 (z 
= 2.67). The outlier was excluded from the remaining analyses. 
3.3.2 Dot Probe Results 
 RT analyses were conducted for experimental trials in which an accurate response was 
given. Participants’ responses were very accurate (M = .946), and no participant had less than 
75% correct responses. The same non-recursive method was used to identify outliers (Van Selst 
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& Jolicoeur, 1994) as in Study 1
2
. Outliers made up 2.81% of correct RT data and were excluded 
from analysis.  
 A 2 (Anxiety Group: HTA vs. LTA) X 3 (Emotion: Angry vs. Fear vs. Happy) X 2 
(Congruency: Incongruent vs. Congruent) mixed ANOVA was conducted on the RT data (see 
Table 7). There were no significant effects of Anxiety Group: F (1, 106) = 0.20, MSE = 
42368.22, p = .656, or Congruency: F (1, 106) = .491, MSE = 626.12, p = .485. There was a 
significant effect of Emotion, F (2, 212) = 3.52, MSE = 608.24, p = .031, ηp
2 
= .032. Follow-up t-
tests revealed that participants responded more quickly to happy trials (M = 516) than angry 
trials (M = 522), t (107) = 2.18, p = .032, d = .209, or fear trials ((M = 521), t (107) = 2.19, p = 
.031, d = .210. Finally, there was a significant Anxiety Group X Congruency interaction, F (1, 
106) = 6.61, MSE =626.12, p = .012, ηp
2 
= .059. The LTA group had larger Congruency effects 
(M = 6.5 ms) than the HTA group (M = -3.7 ms), t (106) = 2.59, p = .011, d = .249. There were 
no other interactions, Fs < 1, ps > .40; thus, the Congruency effect did not vary by emotion.  
As in Study 1, overall, facilitation, and disengagement bias scores were computed. T-tests 
were computed comparing bias scores for each group and emotion to 0 (see Table 8). Contrary to 
expectations, the LTA group showed difficulty disengaging from fear faces. There were no other 
significant biases. 
 Correlations between the bias scores and the questionnaire measures were also computed. 
The results are presented in Table 9. There were no significant correlations. 
                                                     
2
 When these data were analysed using an alternate hard cut-off outlier procedure, the ABT results were similar and 
the reliability estimates were similar or lower. 
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3.3.2.1 Dot Probe Reliability 
The permutation approach used in Study 1 was also used here. Table 10 presents the 
mean reliability based on the 1000 permutations, 95% confidence intervals based on Fischer’s r-
to-z transformation, and Spearman-Brown corrected reliability estimates. Corrected reliabilities 
ranged from 0 to .53, which are once again below acceptable levels. 
3.3.3 Emotional Cueing Results 
 Data from two participants were excluded from the emotional cueing analyses for low 
accuracy (< 75% correct trials). The remaining participants were generally accurate (M = .947). 
Inaccurate trials were excluded from the RT analyses. The same method was used for identifying 
outliers as in Study 1 (Van Selst & Jolicoeur, 1994). Outliers made up 2.69% of correct RT data 
and were excluded from analysis.  
A 2 (Anxiety Group: HTA vs. LTA) X 4 (Emotion: Angry vs. Fear vs. Happy vs. 
Neutral) X 2 (Congruency: Incongruent vs. Congruent) mixed ANOVA was conducted on the 
RT data. Table 7 presents RTs by condition. There were no significant effects of Anxiety Group: 
F (1, 104) = .748, MSE = 45935.84, p = .389 or Emotion: F (3, 312) = 1.82, MSE = 576.27, p = 
.143. As expected with the shorter SOA, there was a significant effect of Congruency, F (1, 104) 
= 37.04, MSE = 1554.06, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .263. Participants responded more quickly to congruent 
trials (M = 519 ms) compared to incongruent trials (M = 503 ms). 
There was a marginally significant Anxiety Group X Emotion interaction, F (3, 312) = 
2.51, MSE = 576.27, p = .059; however, paired samples t-tests revealed no differences between 
the LTA and HTA groups for angry, fear, happy, or neutral RTs, ts < 1.5, ps > .20. There were 
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no other interactions, Fs < 1.5, ps > .15. Thus, the ANOVA revealed no evidence of anxiety-
related ABTs.  
As in Study 1, the three bias indices were calculated for the emotional cueing task (e.g., 
Koster et al., 2006a). Planned t-tests were conducted comparing these bias scores to 0 for each 
group and emotion. The LTA group showed significant negative facilitation biases for angry and 
happy faces and a significant disengage bias for fear faces. The HTA group showed no 
significant biases. 
 Correlations between the bias indices and the questionnaire data are presented in Table 
10. There were no significant correlations. 
3.3.3.1 Emotional Cueing Reliability 
Table 9 presents the reliabilities for the difference scores from the emotional cueing 
paradigm. The overall, facilitation, and disengage bias scores had low but somewhat variable 
reliability, with corrected estimates between .03 and .58. In general, higher reliability estimates 
were observed for the happy trials compared with the angry and fear trials. The congruency 
scores were somewhat more consistent, with corrected reliabilities ranging from .39 to .47.  
3.3.4 Between Task Correlations 
To determine whether bias scores on the two tasks were related, Pearson’s correlations 
were computed between bias scores on the dot probe and emotional cueing tasks for each 
emotion. There were no significant correlations for angry trials, ps > .05. For fear trials, the 
following positive correlations were observed: between the two overall fear biases, r (106) = .34, 
p < .01; between the emotional cueing overall bias and the dot probe facilitation bias, r (106) = 
.25, p < .01; between the emotional cueing facilitation bias and the dot probe overall bias, r (106) 
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= .22, p < .05; between the emotional cueing disengage bias and the dot probe overall bias, r 
(106) = .29, p < .01; and between the emotional cueing disengage bias and the dot probe 
facilitation bias, r (106) = .21, p < .05. For happy trials, the following negative correlations were 
observed: between the two overall happy biases, r (106) = -.20, p < .05; between the two 
disengage biases, r (106) = -.29, p < .01; and between the emotional cueing overall bias and the 
dot probe disengage bias, r (106) = -.25, p = .01. 
3.4 Discussion 
3.4.1 Response Times and Reliability 
As predicted, the shorter SOA in Study 2 resulted in a significant overall congruency 
(cueing) effect in the emotional cueing task; however, this cueing effect did not vary as a 
function of anxiety group or emotion. Overall, the results of Study 2 are consistent with Study 1. 
Specifically, there was no evidence of ABT for high anxious participants with either the dot 
probe or emotional cueing task, and the reliability of the bias scores was again unacceptably low 
(ranging from .01 to .53 for the dot probe task, and ranging from .03 to .58 for the emotional 
cueing task). Thus, measures of early attention to threat also appear to have poor reliability. 
Contrary to expectations, there were significant attentional biases in the LTA group in 
Study 2 (see Table 8). Specifically, the LTA group showed difficulty disengaging from fear faces 
in both tasks, and showed negative facilitation biases to both angry and happy faces in the 
emotional cueing task. It is difficult to directly compare the current dot probe results to the rest 
of the literature, as relatively few studies have used fear faces and even fewer studies have used 
Koster et al. (2004)’s delayed disengagement indices. Generally, though, when biases for fear 
faces (and other threat stimuli) are found in dot probe tasks, these biases tend to occur in the 
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HTA rather than the LTA group (Fox, 2002), which is inconsistent with the current findings. 
Similarly, most biases in the emotional cueing literature occur in the HTA group and not the 
LTA group (Fox et al., 2002: Experiment 1; Fox et al., 2001: Experiments 2, 3, and 4). Mogg et 
al. (2008) did find negative 12-ms overall bias to angry faces in their LTA group in an emotional 
cueing task, but they did not test this effect for significance. Though it is unclear how the current 
results fit in the existing literature, Study 2 provides some evidence that LTA participants are 
faster to initially move their attention to neutral faces compared with emotional faces (in the 
emotional cueing task) and that they may have some difficulty disengaging their attention from 
fear faces (in both tasks). 
3.4.2 Convergent Validity 
Unlike in Study 1, in Study 2 there were small but significant correlations between dot 
probe and emotional cueing bias scores for the fear faces. There were also significant 
correlations between dot probe and emotional cueing scores for happy faces, but these 
correlations were not in the expected direction and are therefore difficult to interpret.  
On the whole, these results remain consistent with previous findings on the convergent 
validity of RT measures of ABT, in that other studies have shown no correlations (Dalgleish et 
al., 2003; Mogg et al., 2000; Gotlib et al., 2004) or small correlations (Brosschot, de Ruiter, & 
Kindt, 1999; Egloff & Hock, 2003).  
3.4.3 Attentional Bias 
Why did Study 2 fail to find anxiety-related ABT in the HTA group? One possibility is 
that the low reliability of the measures reduced the power to detect differences (Kopriva & Shaw, 
1991) and resulted in the lack of ABT findings. Another possibility is that the differences in 
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methodology between previously published tasks and the tasks used in Study 1 and Study 2 
resulted in the lack of ABT in the current tasks. Although these changes in methodology were 
made purposefully to improve the tasks (e.g., adding fear faces) and to make dot probe and 
emotional cueing tasks as similar as possible (e.g., the changes in timing and display 
parameters), the literature clearly demonstrates that methodological factors can moderate ABT 
effects, at least in the dot probe paradigm. This limitation will be addressed in Study 3. 
Finally, a third possibility is that the failure to observe ABT with HTA participants was 
due to a lack of a state anxiety induction. Several prominent theoretical models of anxiety-related 
ABT specify a role for state anxiety. For example, Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews 
(1988, 1997) propose that whereas trait anxiety determines whether attention is directed toward 
threat (with HTA) or away from threat (LTA), state anxiety affects the extent to which stimuli 
are perceived as threatening. In a later model by Mathews and Macintosh (1998), high state 
anxiety again lowers the threshold at which stimuli are perceived as threatening and thus affects 
the threshold at which attentional capture occurs. High trait anxiety is proposed to heighten this 
effect. With relatively weak threat cues, attentional biases in non-clinically anxious populations 
may therefore only be seen when both trait anxiety and state anxiety are high (e.g., Mathews & 
Macintosh, 1998). 
A number of empirical studies also suggest that ABT might be more likely to occur when 
participants are in an anxious state. Quigley, Nelson, Carriere, Smilek, and Purdon (2012) sought 
to examine the relative contributions of state and trait anxiety to attentional biases using an eye-
tracking paradigm. They recruited HTA and LTA participants and asked them to view threat and 
neutral photos while their eye movements were monitored. The eye tracking task occurred both 
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before and after state anxiety induction. The authors found no effect of trait anxiety, but a 
significant effect of state anxiety such that participants in both groups spent more time viewing 
the threat images after the state anxiety induction. These results were recently replicated by 
Nelson, Purdon, Quigley, Carriere, and Smilek (2014). 
In a much earlier study, MacLeod and Mathews (1988) examined ABT under high and 
low state anxiety. HTA and LTA participants were recruited under low state anxiety conditions 
(12 weeks before a major exam) or high state anxiety conditions (1 week before the exam). In the 
low state anxiety testing session, there was no significant ABT for either group. In the high state 
anxiety testing session, however, they found that HTA individuals preferentially attended to 
exam-related threat words while LTA individuals avoided such words.  
In sum, theoretical accounts and empirical evidence suggest that ABT may be more likely 
to occur in high state anxiety contexts. Interestingly, the empirical evidence also suggests that the 
reliability of ABT scores may also be higher under conditions of high state anxiety. Bar-Haim et 
al. (2010) is one of the only published studies to both observe ABT and to assess the reliability 
of ABT scores. The Spearman-Brown corrected reliability of dot probe bias scores in that study 
was higher than most other estimates (.62, in the acceptable range). The Bar-Haim et al. (2010) 
study was unique in that participants were living in a region with frequent rocket attacks. Many 
participants lived so close to the origin of the attacks that they had only 15 seconds to seek safety 
after siren alerts sounded. The high levels of state anxiety experienced by these participants may 
have contributed to the higher observed reliability of their dot probe scores, perhaps by 
increasing ABT effect sizes (e.g., Miller & Ulrich, 2013). Thus, the absence of ABT for HTA 
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participants and the low reliability of ABT scores in Study 2 may both be due, at least in part, to 
the absence of a state anxiety manipulation. Study 3 addresses this limitation. 
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Chapter 4 
State Anxiety, Trait Anxiety, and  
the Psychometric Properties of ABT 
4.1 Study 3 Introduction 
The purpose of Study 3 is to examine the reliability of dot probe and emotional cueing 
scores under conditions that are likely to produce large and potentially reliable ABT effects. To 
this end, Study 3 uses “classic” procedures that have produced significant biases with an 
undergraduate student population. Participants also undergo a state anxiety manipulation before 
completing the ABT tasks. 
4.1.1 Choosing ABT Task Procedures 
To choose the particular ABT tasks, all published studies examining trait anxiety-related 
ABT in adults using emotional faces as stimuli were reviewed. Because minor changes in 
methodology between studies are very common, very few exact replications exist in the 
literature. In an attempt to choose classic or common procedures, the dot probe task methodology 
from Mogg and Bradley (1999) was selected. Notably, these procedures were successfully 
replicated by Bradley, Mogg, and Millar (2000), although the latter study found only state-
anxiety related ABT rather than trait anxiety-related ABT. 
For the emotional cueing task, the procedures from Mogg, Holmes, Garner, & Bradley 
(2008) were chosen. The authors found a significant disengagement bias for the state anxious 
group. In a very similar study using schematic faces, Fox, Russo, and Dutton (2002) found the 
same pattern of results in a high trait anxious group. 
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4.1.2 State Anxiety Manipulation 
A number of different procedures have been developed to conduct research with 
participants experiencing specific mood states. Some studies have used naturally-occurring mood 
states by having participants complete the task before an important exam, for example (e.g., 
MacLeod & Mathews, 1988; Mogg, Bradley, & Hallowell, 1994). Unfortunately, naturally-
occurring mood states typically do not allow for random assignment to condition and thus can 
make it more difficult to separate the influence of state anxiety and trait anxiety. These 
procedures are also logistically difficult to implement, as they often require that many 
participants complete the study in a very short amount of time (e.g., in the week before an exam). 
To avoid these problems, mood induction procedures have also been developed for use in 
the lab. In the anxiety literature in particular, common procedures include the following: asking 
participants to perform a video-taped speech (Phillips & Giancola, 2008; Sayette, Martin, Perrott, 
Wertz, & Hufford, 2001); having participants read Velten emotional statements such as ‘I am so 
worried that I can’t concentrate on anything’ (York, Borkovec, Vasey, & Stern, 1987); and 
asking participants to focus on an anxiety-provoking event in their past while listening to music 
(Jefferies, Smilek, Eich, & Enns, 2008). The last procedure has been particularly well-validated 
by Eich and colleagues at the University of British Columbia (see Eich, Ng, Macaulay, Percy, & 
Grebneva, 2007, for a review). They label this method the MCI technique, as it uses Music (M) 
and Contemplation (C) in an Idiographic (I) context. Although there is a paucity of research 
comparing different mood induction techniques, especially with regard to anxiety, there is some 
evidence that MCI-like procedures may be more effective than other procedures in inducing sad 
mood (Van der Does, 2002). MCI has high success in inducing mood states that seem authentic 
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to participants and the same mood can be induced repeatedly (Eich et al., 2007; Hernandez, 
Vander Wal, & Spring, 2011).  
The MCI procedure was chosen for Study 3 because it is well-validated, can be 
implemented consistently in a lab setting, and has been successfully used in previous studies of 
ABT (Quigley et al., 2012; Nelson et al., 2014). The effects of the state anxiety manipulation on 
ABT and on the reliability of the biases will be examined. 
4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Participants 
The recruitment procedures were identical to the previous two studies. No individuals 
who had completed Study 1 or 2 were permitted to participate in Study 3.  
A power analysis (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) was conducted using the 
average within-group effect size for ABT from the Bar-Haim et al. (2010) meta-analysis (d = 
.45). Assuming a two-tailed alpha of .05, 40 participants per group resulted in power of 
approximately 80% (79.3%). Because participants would be randomly assigned to one of two 
state anxiety manipulation conditions, 80 HTA and 80 LTA participants were recruited.  
Overall, one hundred sixty students (122 female; 36 male; 2 chose not to disclose their 
sex) participated in the study in exchange for course credit. The mean age of participants was 
20.1 years. Participants identified primarily as White (38%), East Asian (30%) and South Asian 
(14%). Other groups represented in the sample included Southeast Asian (6%), Black (3%), 
Middle Eastern (2%), Biracial (2%), Caribbean (1%), and Hispanic (1%). Three participants 
(2%) chose not to disclose their race. 
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4.2.2 Measures and Materials 
The questionnaire materials were identical to those in the previous two studies, with the 
addition of two measures to determine the effectiveness of the anxiety manipulation: an Affect 
Grid and a Genuineness Rating. 
4.2.2.1 Affect Grid (Russell, Weiss, & Mendelsohn, 1989) 
This measure is a 9 X 9 grid with “Affect” on the X axis (Extremely Unpleasant to 
Extremely Pleasant) and “Arousal” on the Y axis (Extremely Low Energy to Extremely High 
Energy). Increases in anxiety are indexed by decreases in pleasantness and increases in arousal.  
4.2.2.2 Genuineness Rating (Jefferies, Smilek, Eich, & Enns, 2008) 
As in previous mood induction research, participants indicated how genuinely they rated 
their mood in the study on a 9-point scale. 
4.2.2.3 Dot probe task 
For the dot probe task, each of the two emotion images (one Anger, one Happy) for each 
of 32 actors was paired with a Neutral image, resulting in 64 pairs. The location of the emotional 
face and the location of the target were counterbalanced across participants. Each participant saw 
each pair of faces once in Block 1 and once in Block 2, for a total of 128 trials. Notably, Mogg 
and Bradley’s (1999) study comprised only 64 trials. To ensure sufficient power to detect 
reliability, the current task was double its length. Blocks were separated by a self-paced rest 
break and trials were presented in randomized order within blocks. Sixteen practice trials were 
created using additional NimStim images.  
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 On each trial, participants saw a fixation cross in the centre of the screen for 500 ms, 
followed by a face pair for 500 ms. The relative dimensions and the visual angles were retained 
from Mogg and Bradley (1999), but the actual sizes were modified to fit with the current lab set-
up. Participants were seated approximately 70 cm from a 25-inch flat screen computer monitor. 
The face images subtended 2.6 degrees of visual angle (3.7 cm) wide by 4.0 degrees of visual 
angle (5 cm) tall and appeared 2.0 degrees of visual angle (2.5 cm) from fixation. Emotional 
pictures and probes appeared on the left and right with equal frequency. After the offset of the 
face pair, a single dot probe was presented in the location of one of the faces. Participants were 
instructed to press “a” or “l” as quickly and as accurately as possible to indicate the location of 
the probe (left or right). On congruent trials, the probe appeared in the location previously 
occupied by the emotional face. On incongruent trials, the probe appeared in the location 
previously occupied by the neutral face. The inter-trial interval varied between 500 and 1250 ms. 
4.2.2.4 Emotional cueing task 
The cue faces consisted of one emotion image for each of 16 NimStim actors (one Angry, 
one Happy, and one Neutral). There were 192 experimental trials with a self-paced rest break 
halfway through the task. Consistent with Mogg et al. (2008), 75% of trials were valid and 25% 
were invalid. There were 64 trials for each emotion: Anger (48 valid, 16 invalid), Happiness (48 
valid, 16 invalid), and Neutral (48 valid, 16 invalid). Each face image was presented four times 
in the experiment. Trials were presented in randomized order. Twelve practice trials were created 
using additional NimStim images.  
The size of the face images and their distance from fixation were computed using visual 
angle calculations from Mogg et al. (2008). Each face was presented within one of two gray 
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boxes measuring 7.6 cm tall by 5.7 cm wide. The boxes appeared to the left and right of fixation, 
with 2.95 cm separating the fixation cross from the inner edge of each box. On each trial, a 
fixation cross and the boxes were presented for 1000 ms. Then, a photograph of a face appeared 
in one of the boxes for 200 ms. Fifty milliseconds later, a target arrow measuring 0.6 cm tall 
appeared to the left or right of fixation. Participants were asked to press “k” or “m” as quickly 
and accurately as possible to indicate the direction the arrow pointed (up or down). On congruent 
trials, the target appeared in the box previously occupied by the face; on incongruent trials, the 
target appeared in the opposite box. The target remained on the screen for 6000 ms or until 
response. The inter-trial interval varied between 500 and 1050 ms. 
4.2.3 Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to the State Anxiety or Calm group. Both groups 
completed a package of questionnaires: the STICSA Trait, STICSA State, DASS-21, SDS, and 
Affect Grid. Participants then completed the mood induction. They were instructed to think 
about an anxious or calm event in their lives while listening to music that promoted an anxious 
or calm mood (see Jefferies et al., 2008; Quigley et al., 2012). The complete script and the music 
selections can be found in Appendix A. After five minutes, they again completed the Affect Grid 
and STICSA State. 
Next, based on their counterbalance condition, participants completed the first of the two 
computer tasks (emotional cueing or dot probe). As in previous research (e.g., Jefferies et al., 
2008), the music continued to play during the computer tasks.  
Participants completed the Affect Grid and STICSA State again. They then repeated the 
same mood induction procedure for five minutes to ensure the induced mood did not decay 
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before the second computer task. They completed the Affect Grid, STICSA State, and the second 
computer task. Finally, they completed the Affect Grid, the STICSA State, and the Genuineness 
Rating. Participants in the Anxious induction condition watched an amusing video to restore a 
positive mood before leaving the lab.  
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Anxiety Groups 
 Participants were divided into groups based on their trait anxiety (STICSA) scores at the 
testing session. Participants whose STICSA Trait scores varied between the testing session and 
the in-lab session to the extent that they switched groups (participants with scores below 27 on 
the screening session and above 45 on the in-lab session, or vice-versa) were identified (n = 2). 
To ensure stable and accurate measurement of trait anxiety, these participants were excluded 
from analysis. Two groups were created based on the median in-lab STICSA Trait score (34). 
The groups consisted of 76 participants (LTA) and 82 participants (HTA), respectively.  
 Demographics and questionnaire scores for the two groups are presented in Table 11. A 
small amount of questionnaire data (<1.5%) was missing; these missing data were replaced using 
Expectation-Maximization imputation. The two groups did not differ on age or sex (see Table 
11), but differed as expected on trait and state anxiety (STICSA), depression, anxiety, and stress 
symptoms (DASS), and social desirability scores (SDS).  
 As in Mogg and Bradley (1999), Social Desirability Scale (SDS) scores were examined 
for unusually large values. The box-and-whisker plot did not identify any outliers, and when 
SDS scores were transformed to z-scores no value was above 2.5. Therefore, no participants 
were excluded for scoring unusually high on social desirability.  
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4.3.2 State Anxiety Manipulation Check 
 Participants were randomly assigned to the Anxious or Calm mood conditions. In the 
Calm condition, there were 35 LTA participants and 41 HTA participants. In the Anxious 
condition, there were 43 LTA participants and 39 HTA participants. All participants completed 
the STICSA State and Affect Grid five times during the study to assess the effectiveness of the 
state anxiety manipulation. The first observation (T1) occurred at the beginning of the study; the 
second (T2) occurred immediately after the first mood induction; the third (T3) occurred after the 
first computer task; the fourth (T4) occurred after the second mood induction; and the fifth (T5) 
observation occurred after the second computer task. Mood ratings by Time, Anxiety Group and 
Condition are presented in Figure 3. Increases in anxiety are represented by increases on the 
STICSA State, decreases in Pleasantness ratings on the Affect Grid, and increases in Arousal 
ratings on the Affect Grid. 
 To assess the effectiveness of the state anxiety manipulation for the two groups, a 2 
(Anxiety Group: LTA vs. HTA) X 2 (Condition: Anxious vs. Calm Induction) X 5 (Time: T1 vs. 
T2 vs. T3 vs. T4 vs. T4) mixed ANOVA was conducted on the three measures of mood. For the 
STICSA State, there were main effects of Anxiety Group (F (1, 154) = 64.17, MSE = 242.80, p < 
.001, ηp
2 
= .294), Condition (F (1, 154) = 81.40, MSE = 242.80, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .346), and Time 
(F (2.41, 371.23) = 17.84, MSE = 27.30, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .104). Critically, there was a Condition X 
Time interaction, F (2.41, 371.23) = 73.91, MSE = 2017.57, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .324. Follow-up tests 
revealed no effect of Condition at T1, t (156) = .23, p = .815, but significant effects of Condition 
at each time point after the mood induction: T2 (t (156) = 9.23, p < .001, d = 1.47 ), T3 (t (156) = 
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6.41, p < .001, d = 1.02), T4 (t (156) = 9.15, p < .001, d = 1.46), and T5 (t (156) = 7.27, p < .001, 
d = 1.16). No other interactions reached significance, ps > .05.  
 For the Pleasantness ratings, there were main effects of Anxiety Group (F (1, 154) = 
10.20, MSE = 6.01, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .062), Condition (F (1, 154) = 172.42, MSE = 6.01, p < .001, 
ηp
2 
= .528), and Time (F (3.18, 489.38) = 27.54, MSE = 1.46, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .152). There was 
again a Condition X Time interaction, F (3.18, 489.38) = 52.42, MSE = 1.46, p < .001, ηp
2 
= 
.254. Follow-up tests revealed no effect of Condition at T1, t (156) = -1.55, p = .122 and 
significant effects of Condition after the mood induction at T2 (t (156) = -16.78, p < .001, d = -
2.67), T3 (t (156) = -8.24, p < .001, d = -1.31), T4 (t (156) = -14.34, p < .001, d = -2.29), and T5 
(t (156) = -8.84, p < .001, d = -1.41). No other interactions reached significance, ps >. 05.  
 Lastly, the Arousal ratings revealed only a main effect of Condition (F (1, 154) = 5.96, 
MSE = 10.39, p < .05, ηp
2 
= .037) and a Condition X Time interaction, F (3.39, 521.5) = 6.30, 
MSE = 1.85, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .039. Follow-up tests revealed no effect of Condition at T1, t (156) = 
0.68, p = .498, but significant effects of Condition after the mood induction at T2 (t (156) = 2.34, 
p < .05, d = .37), T3 (t (156) = 2.27, p < .05, d = .36), T4 (t (156) = 4.04, p < .001, d = .64), and 
T5 (t (156) = 2.35, p < .05, d = .37). There were no other main effects or interactions, ps > .05.  
 Thus, the state anxiety manipulation had its intended effect. After the manipulation, 
participants in the Anxious condition reported higher anxious affect compared to participants in 
the Calm condition, and this difference persisted through the study. Participants also reported 
their affect ratings were genuine throughout the study (M = 7.78 on a 9-point scale, SD = 1.01).  
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4.3.3 Dot Probe Results 
 RT analyses were conducted for experimental trials in which an accurate response was 
given. One participant from the LTA Group had fewer than 75% accurate responses (M = .562) 
and was excluded from the dot probe RT analyses. The other participants’ responses were very 
accurate (M = .989). To identify outliers, the same non-recursive method was used (Van Selst & 
Jolicoeur, 1994).
3
 For the dot probe task, outliers made up 2.96% of correct RT data and were 
excluded from analysis.  
 A 2 (Anxiety Group: HTA vs. LTA) X 2 (Condition: Anxious vs. Calm) X 2 (Emotion: 
Angry vs. Happy) X 2 (Congruency: Incongruent vs. Congruent) mixed ANOVA was conducted 
on the RT data. Table 12 presents the RT data. There was an effect of Congruency, F (1, 153) = 
4.75, MSE = 251.46, p = .031, ηp
2 
= .030, such that participants responded more quickly to 
incongruent (M = 407 ms) compared to congruent (M = 410 ms) trials. There was also a 
marginally significant Anxiety Group X Emotion X Congruency interaction, F (1, 153) = 2.81, 
MSE = 269.95, p = .096, ηp
2 
= .018. To better understand this interaction, traditional dot probe 
bias scores were computed by subtracting the mean RT on congruent trials from the mean RT on 
incongruent trials for both angry and happy face trials. Independent samples t-tests showed no 
difference in bias scores for angry faces between the LTA (-2.1 ms) and HTA (-4.6 ms) groups, t 
(155) = .641, p = .523, d = .103, unlike Mogg and Bradley (1999). For happy faces, in contrast, 
there was a marginally significant difference in bias scores between the LTA (-5.3 ms) and HTA 
(0.8 ms) groups, t (155) = -1.83, p = .070, d = -.293. There were no other main effects or 
interactions. 
                                                     
3
 When these data were analysed using a box and whisker plot outlier procedure (Mogg & Bradley, 1999), the ABT 
results were similar and the reliability estimates were similar or lower. 
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 Next, planned t-tests were conducted comparing bias scores for each group and condition 
to 0, and the results and effect sizes are presented in Table 13. There was a negative bias (a bias 
away) from angry faces in the HTA group in the Anxious condition. No other effects reached 
significance. 
 Correlations between the bias scores and the questionnaire measures were also computed. 
Neither the angry bias score (r = -.067, p = .408) nor the happy bias score (r = .125, p = .120) 
was correlated with trait anxiety (STICSA), nor were they correlated with DASS-Depression or 
SDS scores, ps > .05. When the sample was split by Condition (Anxious vs. Calm) and this 
analysis was repeated, there were again no significant correlations. 
 Because the original Mogg and Bradley (1999) task was only half as long as the current 
dot probe task, the analyses above were repeated using only the first 64 trials. The results were 
the same with the following exceptions: (1) the group difference in bias scores to happy faces 
was no longer marginally significant, t (155) = -1.30, p = .197; (2) when the biases were 
compared to 0, there was a significant bias away from happy faces in the LTA Calm condition, t 
(34) = -3.03, p = .005, d = -.478; and (3) in the Calm condition only, STICSA Trait scores 
correlated negatively with the angry bias (r = -.235, p < .05) and positively with the happy bias (r 
= .265, p < .05). 
4.3.3.1 Dot Probe Reliability 
Table 14 presents the mean reliability based on the 1000 permutations, 95% confidence 
intervals based on Fischer’s r-to-z transformation, and Spearman-Brown corrected reliability 
estimates by group. The corrected reliability estimates for the overall sample were .44 (angry 
trials) and .17 (happy trials). The reliability estimates for angry trials were somewhat higher in 
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the Calm condition than the Anxious condition (corrected estimates .59 in the Calm condition 
and .15 in the Anxious condition). 
4.3.4 Emotional Cueing Results 
 Data from five participants were excluded from the emotional cueing analyses for low 
accuracy (< 75% correct trials). The remaining participants were very accurate (M = .952). 
Inaccurate trials were excluded from the RT analyses. The same non-recursive method adjusting 
the cut-off criterion by sample size was used for identifying outliers (Van Selst & Jolicoeur, 
1994). Outliers made up 2.23% of correct RT data and were excluded from analysis.  
A 2 (Anxiety Group: HTA vs. LTA) X 2 (Condition: Anxious vs. Calm Induction) X 2 
(Emotion: Angry vs. Happy) X 2 (Congruency: Incongruent vs. Congruent) mixed ANOVA was 
conducted on the RT data. In a congruent trial, the target appeared in the location previously 
occupied by the face cue; in an incongruent trial, the target appeared in the opposite location. 
Table 12 presents RTs by condition.  
 The ANOVA revealed a significant effect of Congruency, F (1, 149) = 538.52, MSE = 
2364.43, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .783, such that participants responded more quickly to congruent (M = 
468 ms) than incongruent (M = 543 ms) trials. There was a main effect of Emotion, F (2, 298) = 
4.92, MSE = 535.11, p = .008, ηp
2 
= .032, such that participants responded more quickly to 
neutral trials (M = 484 ms) than happy trials (M = 488 ms), t (152) = 2.64, p = .009, d = .214. 
There was also an Emotion X Congruency interaction, F (2, 298) = 10.27, MSE = 620.45, p < 
.001, ηp
2 
= .065. Follow-up tests showed a larger overall Congruency effect for Angry trials (M = 
85 ms) than Happy trials (M = 67 ms), t (152) = 4.23, p < .001, d = .342, or Neutral trials (M = 
72 ms) trials, t (152) = 3.16, p = .002, d = .255. Finally, there was a marginally significant 
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Anxiety Group X Condition X Emotion X Congruency interaction, F (2, 298) = 2.87, MSE = 
620.45, p = .058, ηp
2 
= .019.  
To better understand this interaction, follow-up ANOVAs were conducted for each 
Condition (Anxious vs. Calm) separately. In the Calm condition, the Anxiety Group X Emotion 
X Congruency interaction was not significant, F (2, 146) = 0.58, MSE = 614.10, p = .943. In the 
Anxious condition, this interaction was significant, F (2, 152) = 4.70, MSE = 626.54, p = .01, ηp
2 
= .118.  
The same bias scores from Study 1 and Study 2 (overall, facilitation, and disengagement) 
were computed for both angry and happy trials to assist in interpreting this interaction. Notably, 
the facilitation and disengagement biases simply represent the effects of emotion relative to 
neutral for congruent (facilitation) and incongruent (disengagement) trials. 
Four 2 X 2 ANOVAs were conducted on the Anxious condition data to examine the 
effect of emotional cues relative to neutral cues separately in the congruent and incongruent cue 
conditions. 
i. Congruent angry trials. To determine if there were differences between groups in 
the facilitation bias for angry faces, a 2 (Anxiety Group: HTA vs. LTA) X 2 
(Emotion: Angry vs. Neutral) ANOVA was conducted on congruent trial RTs. 
There was a marginally significant Anxiety Group X Emotion interaction, F (1, 
76) = 3.22, MSE = 130.44, p = .08, ηp
2 
= .041, such that the facilitation bias was 
marginally larger for the HTA group (6 ms) compared to the LTA group (-1 ms).  
ii. Incongruent angry trials. To determine if there were differences between groups 
in the disengagement bias for angry faces, a 2 (Anxiety Group: HTA vs. LTA) X 
 52 
2 (Emotion: Angry vs. Neutral) ANOVA was conducted on incongruent trial RTs. 
There was a significant Anxiety Group X Emotion interaction, F (1, 76) = 4.38, 
MSE = 981.89, p = .04, ηp
2 
= .055, such that the disengagement bias was larger for 
the HTA group (19 ms) than the LTA group (-2 ms).  
iii. Congruent happy trials. A 2 (Anxiety Group: HTA vs. LTA) X 2 (Emotion: 
Happy vs. Neutral) ANOVA on RTs for congruent trials revealed no interaction, 
F (1, 76) = 0.31, MSE = 278.32, p = .58. 
iv. Incongruent happy trials. A 2 (Anxiety Group: HTA vs. LTA) X 2 (Emotion: 
Happy vs. Neutral) ANOVA on RTs for incongruent trials revealed a significant 
interaction, F (1, 76) = 9.61, MSE = 862.05, p = .003, ηp
2 
= .112. The HTA group 
had a larger disengagement bias for happy trials (14 ms) than the LTA group (-15 
ms). 
 Next, planned t-tests were conducted comparing bias scores to 0 for each group and 
condition. Results are presented in Table 13. In the Calm condition, the HTA group (15 ms 
effect; p = .02) and the LTA group (17 ms effect; p = .07) showed difficulty disengaging from 
angry faces. In the Anxious condition, LTA participants showed negative overall and disengage 
biases for happy faces, which may represent avoidance (e.g., Koster et al., 2006a). HTA 
participants in the Anxious condition showed biases (facilitation, overall, and disengage biases) 
for angry faces, which is typically interpreted as biased attention toward threat (e.g., Mogg et al., 
2008; Fox et al., 2002). HTA participants also showed difficulty disengaging from happy faces. 
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 Correlations between the bias indices and the questionnaire data are presented in Table 
15. In the Anxious condition, trait anxiety correlated with the overall bias and the disengage bias 
for happy faces but not angry faces. There were no other significant correlations. 
4.3.4.1 Emotional cueing reliability 
Table 14 presents the reliabilities for the difference scores (congruency effects, overall 
biases, facilitation biases, and disengage biases) from the emotional cueing paradigm. In the 
overall sample, the congruency scores (which are not a measure of bias but rather measure 
differences in RTs between incongruent and congruent cues) had Spearman-Brown corrected 
reliability estimates of .56 for angry trials and .59 for happy trials. In contrast, the overall, 
facilitation, and disengage bias scores had very low reliability: Spearman-Brown corrected 
estimates for the biases were between 0 and .19 in the overall sample. There were no notable 
differences in reliability between the Anxious and Calm conditions. 
4.3.5 Between Task Correlations 
To determine whether bias scores on the two tasks were related, Pearson’s correlations 
were computed between all bias scores on the dot probe and emotional cueing tasks. There were 
no significant correlations in the full sample (rs (152) < .15, ps > .05). When the sample was 
divided into the Anxious and Calm conditions, the dot probe happy bias and the emotional 
cueing happy facilitation bias were correlated in the Calm condition only, r (75) = .23, p = .047. 
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4.4 Discussion 
Study 3 examined the psychometric properties of bias scores from classic dot probe and 
emotional cueing tasks in the context of a state anxiety manipulation. The ABT, reliability, and 
convergent validity results are discussed in turn below. 
4.4.1 State Anxiety, Trait Anxiety, and Attentional Biases 
4.4.1.1 Dot probe task 
The current dot probe task was identical to Mogg and Bradley’s (1999) task with the 
addition of a state anxiety manipulation. In the RT analysis, there were no main effects or 
interactions involving state anxiety condition. Unfortunately, the results failed to replicate Mogg 
and Bradley’s (1999) finding of larger bias scores to angry faces for HTA participants compared 
with LTA participants. There was a trend whereby HTA participants showed marginally larger 
bias scores toward happy faces than LTA participants (see Bradley, Mogg, White, Groom, & De 
Bono, 1999, for a similar effect in Generalized Anxiety Disorder), but there were otherwise no 
group differences. The failure to replicate Mogg and Bradley’s (1999) group difference findings 
may be due to the inclusion of the state anxiety manipulation or due to the relatively low 
reliability of dot probe bias scores.  
When the biases for each group were compared to 0, there was a significant negative bias 
(-6 ms) from angry faces for the HTA group in the Anxious condition. This pattern was 
unexpected and is the opposite of what is typically found with HTA participants in the absence 
of a state anxiety manipulation (e.g., Mogg & Bradley, 1999). Notably, a similarly sized negative 
bias (-5 ms) was also found in the LTA group in the Anxious condition in Study 3. Although the 
effect did not reach significance in the LTA group, this pattern suggests that the negative biases 
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are related to state anxiety rather than trait anxiety. Thus, the lab-induced state anxiety 
manipulation appears to have resulted in a bias away from threat in the dot probe task. This bias 
was not present in the Calm condition. This pattern is inconsistent with most previous dot probe 
research on the effects of lab-induced stressors, as other studies typically show larger biases 
toward threat (e.g., Mogg, Mathews, Bird, & Macgregor-Morris, 1990) in the high anxiety 
conditions.  
Mathews and Mackintosh (1998), however, also found negative dot probe biases in their 
anxious state condition—but only for the LTA group. In their cognitive model, Mathews and 
Mackintosh propose that when state anxious participants are asked to perform a task, they make 
efforts to focus on the task and away from both their anxious thoughts and the anxious stimuli. 
This increased effort or task demand may result in the elimination or even the reversal of biases 
toward threat in high state anxious conditions, especially when the threat stimuli are only mildly 
threatening. It is unclear why this pattern was evident in the HTA group in the current study. 
4.4.1.2 Emotional cueing task 
In the Anxious condition, Mogg et al.’s (2008) Anxiety Group X Emotion X Congruency 
interaction was successfully replicated. Furthermore, their finding of a larger disengagement bias 
for angry faces for the HTA group than the LTA group was also replicated. Unlike in Mogg et 
al.’s (2008) study, the current HTA group also showed a marginally larger facilitation bias for 
angry faces and a larger disengagement bias for happy faces compared to the LTA group in the 
Anxious condition. These additional findings (facilitation ABTs; difficulty disengaging from 
happy faces) are likely a result of the state anxiety manipulation, whereas the disengagement bias 
with angry faces appears to be associated with trait anxiety generally (see Table 13).  
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As discussed earlier, RT difference scores are more reliable when effect sizes are large 
(Miller & Ulrich, 2013). The current emotional cueing results are particularly important because 
they allow for the examination of the reliability of ABT biases in a context where ABTs were 
actually observed.  
4.4.2 Reliability 
4.4.2.1 Dot probe  
Although the observed reliabilities for the dot probe task were higher than some previous 
estimates in the literature (e.g., Staugaard, 2009; Waechter et al., 2014), they remained 
unacceptably low and were generally not higher than the reliabilities from Study 1 and Study 2. 
The reliability estimates for angry trials were somewhat higher in the Calm condition than the 
Anxious condition, which suggests that the anxiety induction did not improve the reliability of 
dot probe bias scores. Overall, the results of Study 3 support the growing consensus that dot 
probe scores have low reliability.  
4.4.2.2 Emotional cueing 
Study 3 is among the first studies to both find significant biases and to examine their 
reliability (see also Bar-Haim et al., 2010, Cooper et al., 2011). Generally, the reliability 
estimates for emotional cueing biases were very low (Spearman-Brown corrected estimates 
between 0 and .19 with the overall sample) and similar to the reliability estimates from Study 1 
and Study 2. There were no clear changes in reliability across the Calm and Anxious conditions; 
again, the state anxiety induction did not consistently improve reliability. These results clearly 
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indicate that merely finding significant biases does not guarantee these biases have adequate 
reliability.  
We did replicate Enock et al.’s (2014) observation that the reliability of the congruency 
scores was higher than that of the bias scores; however, congruency scores are not a measure of 
bias in the emotional cueing paradigm as they simply measure the difference in RT between 
incongruent and congruent trials for each emotion.  
4.4.3 Convergent Validity 
The bias scores in Study 3 again had low convergent validity. There was only one 
significant correlation between the bias scores from the two tasks, and this correlation was small 
(r = .23) and occurred only in the Calm condition. It is likely that the correlations between tasks 
were limited at least to some extent by the poor reliability of the bias scores or by other factors 
(as discussed in Miller & Ulrich, 2013). Alternatively, these tasks may be indexing different 
constructs, such as ABT at different time points. For example, attentional biases measured 250 
ms after the onset of the emotional face (as in the emotional cueing paradigm used in Study 3) 
may be largely unrelated to attentional bias measured 500 ms after the onset of the emotional 
face (as in the dot probe paradigm used in Study 3). Notably, however, Study 1 and Study 2 used 
identical timing parameters for both the dot probe and emotional cueing tasks, and still failed to 
find consistent and substantial evidence of convergent validity. 
4.4.4 Study 3 Summary 
 Study 3 assessed the reliability of dot probe and emotional cueing bias scores in high 
anxious and low anxious participants under conditions of high state anxiety to increase the 
likelihood of producing large and potentially reliable attentional biases. In the dot probe task, 
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there were no significant differences in attention measures between the HTA and LTA groups. 
When the biases for each group and condition were compared to 0, the HTA group in the 
Anxious condition actually showed a bias away from threat faces. In the emotional cueing task, 
there were significant group differences: HTA participants showed larger facilitation and 
disengage biases to angry faces than LTA participants. When the biases for each group and 
condition were compared to 0, the Anxious and Calm HTA groups each showed difficulty 
disengaging from angry faces. In the Anxious condition, the HTA group also showed facilitated 
attention to angry faces and an overall bias for angry faces.  
Despite the fact that there were significant attentional biases in Study 3, the reliability 
estimates for both dot probe and emotional cueing biases were unacceptably low. The anxiety 
induction did not substantially improve the reliability of the bias scores.  
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Chapter 5 
General Discussion 
5.1 Summary of Findings 
Cognitive processing biases, including ABT, are seen as a critical (e.g., Beck & Clark, 
1997) and often as a causal (e.g., Mathews & MacLeod, 2002) factor in the development and 
maintenance of anxiety disorders. Cognitive processing biases have inspired hundreds of 
empirical and theoretical papers (see Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Ouimet, Gawronski, & Dozois, 2009 
for reviews), and are seen as an important target of intervention in anxiety disorders treatment 
(e.g., Cognitive Therapy: Beck & Clark, 1997; Cognitive Bias Modification: MacLeod & 
Mathews, 2012). Despite the clear theoretical importance of ABT, recent investigations have 
revealed that the most common RT measures of ABT have either poor or unknown reliability. As 
stated earlier, the use of measures with low reliability in ABT research (a) reduces power to 
detect correlations and group differences (e.g., Kopriva & Shaw, 1991); (b) contributes to 
inconsistencies in the literature (e.g., Cooper et al., 2011); and (c) impedes progress in our 
understanding of ABT and their association with anxiety disorders (see Van Bockstaele et al., 
2014). 
Three studies were conducted to examine the reliability and convergent validity of dot 
probe and emotional cueing bias scores. The results are clear and consistent throughout the three 
studies: bias scores from dot probe and emotional cueing tasks have unacceptably low reliability. 
In fact, for all three studies, all of the corrected reliability estimates were below .60. The data 
from the convergent validity analyses were also relatively clear in that the correlations between 
dot probe and emotional cueing scores were low (maximum of .34) and sometimes even negative 
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(e.g., for happy faces in Study 2). Thus, the psychometric properties of dot probe and emotional 
cueing bias scores appear to be quite poor. 
These studies successfully clarify the impact of a number of methodological factors on 
the reliability of these ABT scores. First, these studies were the first to examine the reliability of 
dot probe and emotional cueing bias scores specifically in HTA and LTA individuals, as opposed 
to unselected samples (e.g., Schmukle, 2005; Staugaard, 2009). It was hypothesized that 
selecting extreme groups in terms of trait anxiety would result in more variability in ABT true 
scores, which should increase reliability. Unfortunately, the selection of HTA and LTA 
participants did not substantially improve the reliability of the ABT measures compared with 
previous estimates (e.g., Staugaard, 2009).  
Study 1 and Study 2 were also the first to investigate the reliability of ABT measures 
using fear faces. Unfortunately, fear faces do not appear to result in higher reliability than other 
emotional faces used previously in the ABT reliability literature (e.g., angry faces: Staugaard, 
2009; disgust faces: Waechter et al., 2014).  
Finally, Study 3 examined the effects of a state anxiety manipulation on the reliability of 
ABT scores. It was thought that high levels of state anxiety might increase ABT effect sizes, 
which might improve reliability (e.g., Miller & Ulrich, 2013). The state anxiety manipulation had 
the intended effect on ABT scores and effect sizes, in that there were significant biases in the 
Anxious condition that did not occur in the Calm condition (see Table 13); however, the 
reliability of these biases remained low. In sum, none of the factors investigated here (e.g., 
selecting HTA and LTA participants, adding fear faces, using classic dot probe and emotional 
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cueing tasks; including a state anxiety manipulation; etc.) resulted in adequate reliability for dot 
probe and emotional cueing bias scores. 
5.2  Research Implications 
In Study 3, an effort was made to optimize the size of the effects through the use of 
classic replicable procedures, adequate sample sizes, and the addition of a state anxiety 
induction. Although these efforts resulted in significant attentional biases, the reliability of these 
biases remained below acceptable levels. Continued research to improve the reliability of ABT 
measures is critical for understanding ABT and its role in the development and maintenance of 
anxiety and anxiety disorders. If researchers continue to use RT tasks to index ABT in the future, 
they should assess reliability of the resulting ABT scores. This will aid in interpretations of 
results and contribute to the understanding of the factors (e.g., effect sizes, number of trials, 
methodological differences, etc.) that impact reliability. Continued research on the reliability of 
ABT measures will be essential in the discovery / development of more reliable ABT measures. 
Are there any factors in particular that might be promising in developing more 
psychometrically-sound ABT tasks? Number of trials may be important, in that Miller and Ulrich 
(2013) showed that the number of trials has a strong effect on the reliability of difference scores. 
In Study 1 and Study 2 of this dissertation, the dot probe and emotional cueing tasks both had 32 
trials per participant and condition. In Study 3, the dot probe task had 32 trials per participant 
and condition; the emotional cueing task had 48 (congruent conditions) and 16 (incongruent 
conditions) trials per condition. All tasks took participants 15 to 20 minutes to complete. Because 
the observed reliability estimates for ABT scores were so low, however, increasing the number 
of trials actually shows relatively little promise in terms of reaching acceptable levels of 
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reliability. This can be easily illustrated by using the Spearman-Brown prophecy formula to 
examine corrected reliabilities at different test lengths. For example, if each task used in Study 1 
had four times as many trials per condition (and therefore each took participants roughly a full 
hour to complete), only three of the eighteen bias scores would reach a reliability above .60. It is 
impractical to simply increase the number of trials in these tasks until acceptable levels of 
reliability are attained.  
Miller and Ulrich (2013) also demonstrated that reliabilities are higher when the 
difference scores are taken from opposing task processes, rather than from unrelated or common 
task processes. Using Miller and Ulrich’s (2013) definition, it appears that some of the bias 
scores resulting from the dot probe and emotional cueing tasks result from opposing task 
processes and some result from unrelated task processes. Specifically, in the dot probe task, the 
overall dot probe bias scores result from opposing task processes because increasing attention to 
threat theoretically results in faster RTs in the congruent condition and slower RTs in the 
incongruent condition. The facilitation and disengage indices, in contrast, result from unrelated 
task processes. In the emotional cueing task, the congruency effects (which are not a measure of 
bias) result from opposing task processes. Because the overall bias score is the difference 
between two congruency effects, it represents the difference between two opposing processes. 
Finally, the facilitation and disengagement scores in the emotional cueing task result from 
unrelated task processes. Because they result from opposing processes, the overall dot probe bias 
scores and the emotional cueing congruency scores are more likely to show good reliability 
compared to the other indices (Miller & Ulrich, 2013). Study 3, in particular, shows some limited 
support for this pattern. That said, it is clear that the overall dot probe bias scores have very poor 
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reliability despite the fact that they result from opposing task processes. Future research might 
focus on developing new ABT tasks that use opposing task processes, in particular, in the hope 
that these bias scores might show better reliability. 
 Ultimately, it may be time to look beyond response time measures in ABT research. A 
recent study suggests that eye tracking indices of ABT have adequate to good reliability after the 
first 1500 ms of image display (Waechter et al., 2014). For researchers who are interested in 
overt attention or late processes in attention to threat (e.g., avoidance), eye tracking may provide 
a good alternative to traditional measures like dot probe or emotional cueing bias scores.  
In addition, a recent study by Britton et al. (2013; Experiment 2) demonstrated that 
children had stable neural activation in the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and amygdala on two 
separate occasions when they completed a dot probe task. Twenty-one typically-developing 
children completed the dot probe tasks while in an MRI scanner on two separate visits. Intra-
class correlation (ICC) analyses on the fMRI data were used to measure the reliability of neural 
activation across the two visits. For the contrasts representing ABT (e.g., fear incongruent versus 
fear congruent trials), there was significant stability (ICCs > .70) across the two visits in the 
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and amygdala. Despite the consistency in their neural activation, 
the children’s RT bias scores across the two sessions were not reliable. These results are very 
new, but they do suggest that neural activation may provide more stable measures of ABT than 
RTs and provide an interesting avenue for future research.  
Finally, these results have some implications for the development and refinement of 
cognitive models of attention in anxiety. The amount of measurement error inherent in both dot 
probe and emotional cueing bias scores likely contributes to the inconsistent results observed in 
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the ABT literature. In turn, these inconsistent results impair researchers’ understanding of ABT 
and make it more difficult to develop and successfully test models of cognitive and attentional 
processing in anxiety. The fact that so many excellent and detailed models (e.g., Bar-Haim et al., 
2007; Eysenck, 1997; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Ouimet et al, 2009; Williams et al., 1997) do exist 
in this area is a testament to researchers’ tenacity and the impressive and sustained level of 
interest in this research over the past three decades. To advance our understanding of ABT and to 
more easily test and improve current theoretical models, more psychometrically-sound measures 
of ABT must be developed.  
5.3 Clinical Implications 
A number of researchers suggest that ABT or changes to ABT may be a useful predictor 
of important clinical variables on an individual level (e.g., of therapy outcome; Reinecke, 
Waldenmaier, Cooper, & Harmer, 2013; Legerstee, Tulen, Dierckx, Treffers, Verhulst, & Utens, 
2010; Waters, Mogg, & Bradley, 2012). Given the poor reliability of dot probe and emotional 
cueing bias scores, however, these measures may not allow us to conclude anything of interest 
about an individual. In effect, these bias scores may index largely measurement error. In clinical 
settings, then, these measures are unlikely to be a useful predictor of individual progress or 
recovery in clients who struggle with anxiety. 
These results of the current studies also have implications for our understanding of 
Attentional Bias Modification (ABM), which is a new experimental intervention for anxiety 
disorders with its roots in the ABT literature (MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, & 
Holker, 2002). As described in Chapter 1, typical ABM training tasks are similar to dot probe 
tasks except that the targets appear preferentially in the location previously occupied by the non-
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threat (e.g., neutral or positive/happy) stimulus. The goal of this intervention is to modify ABT 
by training participants to attend to non-threat stimuli. Because ABT is thought to play a causal 
role in anxiety disorders, the objective is to ultimately alleviate individuals’ anxiety problems by 
modifying ABT.  
To date, seven randomized control trials of ABM with clinically-anxious participants 
have been conducted (Amir, Beard, Burns & Bomyea, 2009; Amir, Beard, Taylor et al., 2009;  
Boettcher et al., 2013; Carlbring et al., 2012; Heeren, Reese, McNally, & Philippot, 2012; 
Neubauer, von Auer, Murray, Petermann, Helbig-Lang, & Gerlach, 2013; Schmidt, Richey, 
Buckner & Timpano, 2009). In one of the first RCTs, Amir, Beard, Burns and Bomyea (2009) 
randomly assigned participants with Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD) to complete 8 
sessions of either ABM training or a control task. In both conditions, participants completed a 
dot probe-like task with two words (one threat word, one neutral word) on the screen. In the 
ABM condition, the target always appeared in the location of the neutral word. In the control 
condition, the target was equally likely to appear in the location of either word. Amir, Beard, 
Burns and Bomyea (2009) found large reductions in anxiety symptoms in the ABM condition, 
such that 50% of this group no longer met diagnostic criteria for GAD after the 8 sessions of 
training (compared to 13% in the control condition). Participants in the other six RCTs 
mentioned above also reported reductions in anxiety symptoms after ABM, although in three 
studies the ABM group did not differ from the control group post-treatment (Boettcher et al., 
2013; Carlbring et al., 2012; Neubauer et al., 2013; all of which used internet-delivered ABM). 
Despite the generally positive results of the published RCTs, studies on ABM using 
subclinical populations have been mixed. Some studies show significant effects (e.g., Li, Tan, 
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Qian, & Liu, 2008; Macleod et al., 2002) whereas others show no change from pre-treatment to 
post-treatment (Julian, Beard, Schmidt, Powers, & Smits; 2012) or no differences between the 
ABM group and the control group (Enock et al., 2014). Even with these mixed results, though, 
the most recent ABM meta-analysis (Mogoase, David, & Koster, 2014) was able to conclude that 
ABM has a small but significant effect (g = .26) on anxiety symptoms. 
Thus, ABM is a novel intervention with at least some promise for ameliorating anxiety 
disorder symptoms. In order to improve ABM interventions and optimize symptom change, there 
has been a recent push to better understand the active ingredients and mechanisms that underlie 
post-ABM changes in symptoms (Beard, 2011; Enock et al., 2014; Mogoase et al., 2014). A 
leading theory is that ABM works by changing an individual’s attentional biases, which in turn 
leads to symptom improvement (e.g., Amir, Beard, Taylor et al., 2009). Unfortunately, a lack of 
reliable and valid ABT measures makes it difficult to determine if ABM actually works in this 
way. Mogoase et al. (2014) conducted a mediational analysis to test this proposed mechanism 
and found no significant mediation. The mediation model may have failed because ABT is not 
the true mechanism of change in ABM studies. Alternatively, the low reliability of ABT 
measures may have reduced statistical power to detect significant effects in the mediation 
analysis. Developing more reliable ABT measures will be a critical step in understanding and 
improving ABM and other novel treatments that target attentional biases to alleviate anxiety 
symptoms.  
5.4 Limitations  
There are, of course, a number of limitations to these studies. First, the participants 
consisted of a convenience sample of undergraduate students selected for high and low trait 
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anxiety. This sample was chosen because the majority of the ABT literature is made up of 
similar samples (e.g., Mogg & Bradley, 1999; Mogg et al., 2008; Nelson et al., 2014), and 
because a meta-analysis (Bar-Haim et al., 2007) found no differences in ABT between clinically-
diagnosed participants and non-clinical participants with high self-reported anxiety. When 
designing the study, it therefore seemed more important to maximize the sample size and thus 
increase power to detect ABT than to recruit a (inevitably) much smaller number of clinically-
diagnosed anxious participants. There is no compelling evidence that the psychometric properties 
of ABT would be different in a clinically-diagnosed sample; however, it is a least possible that 
these results might not generalize to individuals suffering from clinically-significant anxiety 
disorders. 
Second, the current reliability results may apply only to the specific dot probe and 
emotional cueing tasks employed in this study. Research on response time tasks has shown that 
reliability can vary depending on the experimental methodology (e.g., as demonstrated by 
Borgmann et al., 2007, using the Simon effect); thus, different methodologies (e.g., different 
display and timing parameters, identification versus localization versus detection tasks, etc.) may 
result in greater reliability. Notably, however, ABT scores from the six unique tasks examined in 
the current studies all had low reliability, and these results converge with other investigations in 
the literature using a variety of methodologies (e.g., Brown et al., 2014; Enock et al., 2014; 
Schmukle, 2005; Staugaard, 2009).  
Third, it should be noted that the current reliability results apply only to dot probe and 
emotional cueing bias scores, and do not necessarily reflect the reliability of ABT measures in 
general. Similarly, the impact of the timing changes and the state anxiety manipulation on 
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reliability may not generalize to other ABT tasks (e.g., the emotional Stroop task, the visual 
search task, attentional blink tasks, and eye tracking tasks). Currently, relatively little is known 
about the specific factors that impact the reliability of bias measures from these tasks. 
Finally, it is important to note that “attention” is generally understood to be a cognitive 
operation that results in the preferential selection of information regardless of modality (e.g., 
Weierich et al., 2008); yet, the current series of studies assessed only measures of visual/spatial 
attention to threat. The true clinical phenomenology of ABT is likely complex and may include 
biased attention to auditory cues (e.g., Kimble, Fleming, Bandy, & Zambetti, 2010), internal 
sensations (Hayward, Ahmad, & Wardle, 2000), and thoughts (e.g., Beck & Clark, 1997). Future 
research should investigate the phenomenology of attentional processes in anxiety generally, 
including the psychometric properties of ABT in different modalities. 
5.5 Future Directions 
There are many possible avenues for future research in this area. As discussed earlier, it 
is important that researchers using ABT tasks consistently evaluate and disseminate the 
psychometric properties of their measures. This will provide key information about the factors 
(e.g., task, effect sizes, number of trials, methodological differences, etc.) that impact reliability. 
Because so little is known about the reliability of ABT measures derived from attentional blink 
and visual search tasks, these two tasks may be particularly important areas for future research. If 
researchers want to reach an understanding of how attention operates in anxiety, a sustained 
scientific effort to understand the psychometric properties of the tools used to measure ABT is 
absolutely essential (see Van Bockstaele et al., 2014, for a similar argument). 
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 Interestingly, of the existing ABT measures with known psychometric properties, eye-
tracking measures appear to be the most promising. Waechter et al. (2014) found adequate to 
good reliability for eye tracking bias scores in a free viewing paradigm after the first 1500 ms of 
image display (Waechter et al., 2014); in addition, the poor reliability of the bias measures prior 
to the first 1500 ms appeared to be due to participants’ consistent tendency to look at the top 
image first, regardless of the image content. Reducing this tendency to look at the top image 
(e.g., through altering display parameters) may result in adequate reliability for measures of early 
attention to threat. A study testing this hypothesis is currently in progress (Waechter, Nelson, & 
Purdon, in preparation). 
A particular advantage of eye-tracking technology is that it can shed light on how 
attentional biases operate in more “real world” situations (e.g., Smilek, Birmingham, Cameron, 
Bischof, & Kingstone, 2006; Mühlberger, Wieser, & Pauli, 2008), such as when completing 
tasks or interpreting complex scenes. It remains to be seen whether eye tracking bias measures 
remain reliable in these more complex contexts. If they do, eye tracking measures of ABT may 
potentially lead to exciting insight into how attention to threat impacts anxiety and its treatment 
in people’s daily lives.  
5.6 Conclusions 
Three studies were conducted to better understand the psychometric properties of dot 
probe and emotional cueing bias scores in high anxious and low anxious participants. Even under 
arguably ideal conditions (e.g., Study 3), the psychometric properties of these measures were 
poor.  
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These results underscore the importance of developing more reliable and clinically-useful 
ABT measures. As long as researchers continue to use measures with low reliability (which in 
fact index more measurement error than ABT), progress in understanding the role of ABT in 
anxiety and its treatment will be limited. Further research, with a focus on developing new tools 
for measuring ABT or improving the reliability of existing measures, is critical.  
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Appendix A: 
Mood Induction Procedure 
Verbal Script: 
Before we begin the visual task I am going to ask you to get into a mood that makes you as 
[anxious, or calm] as you feel comfortable. You can do this by thinking about an event in 
your life where you felt especially [same mood word]. I know that this may not be the 
easiest thing to do, but it is very important for our research. 
I've done this a few times myself so I'll tell you a few things about it. I found that since I 
was the one asking myself to become [same mood word] by thinking about events in my 
own life, I was very much in control of the mood. I could intensify, lessen, and later even end 
the mood quite easily by changing my thoughts. 
I'll begin by turning on some music that people usually find helpful for getting into mood 
that makes them feel [same mood word]. While you are listening to the music, please think 
about a particular event from your past where you were especially (same mood word).  
While you are listening to the music I'd like you to relive this event. When I did this, I 
thought about the time [I was just about to enter an important job interview (anxious 
condition), or I was sitting outside the cottage on vacation (calm condition)]. 
It is important to remember that the more detail you can re-create in your mind about the 
event, the more intensely you'll re-live the same feelings. 
But I also want to reassure you that I will take time at the end of the session to make sure 
you are feeling good again before you leave today. Remember that the goal is to feel as 
[same mood word] as possible for this short period of time. I know this may not be easy, but 
are you willing to try?  
I'll leave you alone now with the music and your thoughts. Please relax in the chair while 
you think about these events. I'll be coming back in 5 minutes and will ask you to rate how 
you are feeling on the mood grid. Because I want you to keep the feeling of [anxiety or 
calm] as long as possible, I won’t be talking with you more than necessary through the rest 
of the experiment. 
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Music Selection 
Anxious Mood Induction Music: 
-  Symphony No. 8 in C Minor: 4. Finale (Bruckner) 
-  Mars, the Bringer of War (Holst) 
-  Grosse Fugue B Flat Major, Op. 133 (Beethoven) 
 
Calm Mood Induction Music: 
- Rodeo: No.2 Corral Nocturne (Copland) 
-  Appalachian Spring (Copland) 
-  Carnival of the Animals: The Swan (Sant-Saens)   
- Venus, the Bringer of Peace (Holst)
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Figure 1. Dot probe task 
+
+
:
+
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Figure 2. Emotional cueing task  
+
+
:
+
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Figure 3. Sample emotional face images
Neutral Calm Anger Fear Happiness
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Figure 4. Study 3 mood ratings by group and observation time 
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Table 1 
Study 1 Means and Standard Deviations for Demographic and Questionnaire Data by Trait Anxiety Group 
 
  
Low Trait Anxiety Group 
 
High Trait Anxiety Group 
    
  
Mean SD 
 
Mean SD 
 
t 
 
p 
           Age 
 
20.45 (3.05) 
 
19.27 (1.81) 
 
2.902 
 
.004 
Sex (1=Female) 0.70 (0.46) 
 
0.75 (0.43) 
 
-.794 
 
.429 
STICSA-Trait 29.28 (4.84) 
 
48.66 (5.72) 
 
-22.868 
 
.000 
STICSA-State 27.54 (5.08) 
 
39.93 (9.25) 
 
-10.336 
 
.000 
DASS-
Depression 
5.32 (4.83) 
 
17.05 (9.11) 
 
-10.018 
 
.000 
DASS-Anxiety 3.62 (3.91) 
 
14.83 (8.63) 
 
-10.407 
 
.000 
DASS-Stress 8.72 (6.90) 
 
21.82 (8.76) 
 
-10.357 
 
.000 
SDS 
 
10.47 (3.74) 
 
7.81 (3.61) 
 
4.523 
 
.000 
           SD = Standard Deviation; STICSA=State-Trait Inventory of Cognitive and Somatic Anxiety; 
DASS=Depression Anxiety Stress Scales; SDS=Social Desirability Scale 
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Table 2 
Study 1 Response Times for Dot Probe Task and Emotional Cueing Task by Group 
 
   
Dot Probe Task 
 
Emotional Cueing Task 
   
Incongruent 
 
Congruent 
 
Neutral-Neutral 
 
Incongruent 
 
Congruent 
LTA 
           
 
Angry 
 
552 
 
553 
   
505 
 
504 
 
Fear  
 
552 
 
553 
   
504 
 
502 
 
Happy  
 
552 
 
547 
   
499 
 
501 
 
Neutral 
     
547 
 
505 
 
503 
            HTA 
          
 
Angry  
 
535 
 
532 
   
492 
 
491 
 
Fear 
 
535 
 
533 
   
493 
 
493 
 
Happy  
 
540 
 
536 
   
494 
 
491 
 
Neutral 
     
537 
 
495 
 
490 
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Table 3 
Study 1 Attentional Bias Scores by Group and Condition 
 
 
Dot Probe Task 
 
Emotional Cueing Task 
 
Bias Score (ms) t df p 
 
Bias Score (ms) t df p 
LTA Group 
         
 
Angry Overall Bias -1.71 -.30 77 .77 
 
-1.70 -.38 76 .71 
 
Angry Facilitation Bias -6.67 -.98 77 .33 
 
-1.71 -.49 76 .63 
 
Angry Disengage Bias 4.96 1.12 77 .26 
 
.01 .00 76 1.00 
 
Fear Overall Bias -1.41 -.23 77 .82 
 
.01 .00 76 1.00 
 
Fear Facilitation Bias -6.55 -1.86 77 .07 
 
.23 .06 76 .95 
 
Fear Disengage Bias 5.14 1.07 77 .29 
 
-.22 -.07 76 .95 
 
Happy Overall Bias 5.08 1.12 77 .27 
 
-3.48 -.74 76 .46 
 
Happy Facilitation Bias -.38 -.12 77 .91 
 
1.61 .50 76 .62 
 
Happy Disengage Bias 5.46 1.27 77 .21 
 
-5.09 -1.52 76 .13 
           HTA Group 
         
 
Angry Overall Bias 2.47 .72 75 .47 
 
-4.96 -1.02 73 .31 
 
Angry Facilitation Bias 4.38 1.44 75 .15 
 
-1.57 -.55 73 .59 
 
Angry Disengage Bias -1.91 -.74 75 .46 
 
-3.39 -.99 73 .33 
 
Fear Overall Bias 2.12 .66 75 .51 
 
-5.32 -.84 73 .40 
 
Fear Facilitation Bias 3.59 1.12 75 .27 
 
-3.53 -.77 73 .44 
 
Fear Disengage Bias -1.47 -.64 75 .53 
 
-1.80 -.55 73 .58 
 
Happy Overall Bias 3.50 .94 75 .35 
 
-2.18 -.52 73 .61 
 
Happy Facilitation Bias .13 .05 75 .96 
 
-1.49 -.49 73 .62 
 
Happy Disengage Bias 3.37 1.21 75 .23 
 
-.69 -.22 73 .83 
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Table 4 
Study 1 Correlations between Bias Scores and Questionnaire Data 
 
 
STICSA Trait STICSA State DASS Depression SDS 
Dot Probe 
    Angry Overall Bias -.01 .01 -.09 .22
*
 
Angry Facilitation Bias .04 .07 .02 .08 
Angry Disengage Bias -.07 -.08 -.16 .17
*
 
Fear Overall Bias .06 -.05 .09 .00 
Fear Facilitation Bias .11 .02 .11 -.03 
Fear Disengage Bias -.01 -.09 .02 .02 
Happy Overall Bias -.11 -.07 -.05 -.01 
Happy Facilitation Bias -.08 -.04 -.08 -.14 
Happy Disengage Bias -.05 -.05 .01 .11 
     Emotional Cueing  
    Angry Overall Bias -.03 -.17
*
 -.10 .11 
Angry Facilitation Bias .01 -.11 -.08 .08 
Angry Disengage Bias -.05 -.13 -.06 .08 
Fear Overall Bias -.04 -.07 -.08 .08 
Fear Facilitation Bias -.09 -.10 -.13 .10 
Fear Disengage Bias .04 .00 .03 .01 
Happy Overall Bias .01 -.04 .03 .06 
Happy Facilitation Bias -.06 -.10 -.09 .07 
Happy Disengage Bias .07 .04 .13 .01 
     STICSA=State-Trait Inventory of Cognitive and Somatic Anxiety; DASS=Depression Anxiety Stress Scales;  
SDS= Social Desirability Scale; * p < .05 
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Table 5 
Study 1 Reliability of Dot Probe and Emotional Cueing Scores 
 
  
Dot Probe Task 
 
Emotional Cueing Task 
  
Permutation 95% Confidence Spearman-Brown 
 
Permutation 95% Confidence Spearman-Brown 
  
 Reliability Interval Corrected Reliability 
 
 Reliability Interval Corrected Reliability 
         Angry Trials 
       Congruency Score - - - 
 
.09 -.07 to .25 .17 
Bias Score .09 -.07 to .24 .16 
 
.00 -.16 to .16 .00 
Facilitation Score .33 .18 to .46 .50 
 
.02 -.14 to .18 .03 
Disengage Score .11 -.05 to .26 .20 
 
-.01 -.17 to .15 - 
         Fear Trials 
       Congruency Score - - - 
 
.28 .13 to .42 .44 
Bias Score .28 .13 to .42 .44 
 
.18 .02 to .33 .30 
Facilitation Score .06 -.10 to .22 .11 
 
.28 .13 to .42 .43 
Disengage Score .15 0 to .30 .26 
 
.05 -.11 to .21 .09 
         Happy Trials 
       Congruency Score - - - 
 
.16 0 to .31 .28 
Bias Score .05 -.11 to .21 .10 
 
.02 -.14 to .18 .03 
Facilitation Score -.08 -.24 to .08 - 
 
.00 -.16 to .16 .00 
Disengage Score .06 -.10 to .22 .12 
 
.03 -.13 to .19 .06 
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Table 6 
Study 2 Means and Standard Deviations for Demographic and Questionnaire Data by Trait Anxiety Group 
 
  
Low Trait Anxiety Group 
 
High Trait Anxiety Group 
    
  
Mean SD 
 
Mean SD 
 
t 
 
p 
           Age 
 
20.79 (2.96) 
 
20.11 (3.75) 
 
1.042 
 
.300 
Sex (1=Female) 0.78 (0.42) 
 
0.78 (0.42) 
 
-.050 
 
.960 
STICSA-Trait 29.02 (4.33) 
 
47.98 (8.66) 
 
-14.492 
 
.000 
STICSA-State 25.57 (4.43) 
 
37.40 (11.52) 
 
-7.098 
 
.000 
DASS-Depression 5.19 (4.85) 
 
17.13 (9.98) 
 
-7.967 
 
.000 
DASS-Anxiety 3.59 (4.44) 
 
14.51 (8.67) 
 
-8.298 
 
.000 
DASS-Stress 7.81 (6.48) 
 
21.53 (10.07) 
 
-8.471 
 
.000 
SDS 
 
10.83 (3.88) 
 
7.25 (3.52) 
 
5.040 
 
.000 
           SD = Standard Deviation; STICSA=State-Trait Inventory of Cognitive and Somatic Anxiety; DASS=Depression Anxiety  
Stress Scales; SDS= Social Desirability Scale 
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Table 7 
Study 2 Response Times for Dot Probe Task and Emotional Cueing Task by Group 
 
   
Dot Probe Task 
 
Emotional Cueing Task 
   
Incongruent 
 
Congruent 
 
Neutral-Neutral 
 
Incongruent 
 
Congruent 
LTA 
           
 
Angry  
 
529 
 
524 
   
531 
 
509 
 
Fear  
 
529 
 
522 
   
533 
 
507 
 
Happy  
 
522 
 
515 
   
523 
 
512 
 
Neutral  
     
517 
 
523 
 
500 
            HTA 
          
 
Angry  
 
514 
 
519 
   
506 
 
497 
 
Fear  
 
515 
 
519 
   
512 
 
497 
 
Happy  
 
513 
 
515 
   
514 
 
501 
 
Neutral  
     
516 
 
511 
 
497 
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Table 8 
Study 2 Attentional Bias Scores by Group and Condition 
 
  
Dot Probe Task 
 
Emotional Cueing Task 
  
Bias Score (ms) t df p d 
 
Bias Score (ms) t df p d 
LTA Group 
            
 
Angry Overall Bias 4.87 .91 52 .37  -1.06 -.15 51 .88  
 
Angry Facilitation Bias  -6.45 -1.76 52 .08   -9.48 -2.31 51 .02* -.32 
 
Angry Disengage Bias  11.32 1.94 52 .06   8.42 1.59 51 .12  
 
Fear Overall Bias  7.40 1.84 52 .07   3.08 .44 51 .66  
 
Fear Facilitation Bias  -4.15 -.97 52 .34   -7.40 -1.95 51 .06  
 
Fear Disengage Bias  11.55 2.65 52 .01* .37  10.48 2.06 51 .04* .29 
 
Happy Overall Bias  7.04 1.76 52 .08   -12.33 -1.16 51 .25  
 
Happy Facilitation Bias  2.77 .63 52 .53   -12.33 -2.91 51 .01* -.41 
 
Happy Disengage Bias  4.26 1.01 52 .32   .00 .00 51 1.00  
              HTA Group 
            
 
Angry Overall Bias 
 
-5.05 -1.14 54 .26 
 
 
-3.83 -.63 53 .53 
 
 
Angry Facilitation Bias 
 
-2.95 -.65 54 .52 
 
 
.59 .13 53 .89 
 
 
Angry Disengage Bias 
 
-2.11 -.42 54 .68 
 
 
-4.43 -1.05 53 .30 
 
 
Fear Overall Bias 
 
-4.33 -.92 54 .36 
 
 
1.11 .16 53 .87 
 
 
Fear Facilitation Bias 
 
-3.00 -.87 54 .39 
 
 
.13 .03 53 .97 
 
 
Fear Disengage Bias 
 
-1.33 -.30 54 .76 
 
 
.98 .21 53 .84 
 
 
Happy Overall Bias 
 
-1.65 -.40 54 .69 
 
 
.26 .04 53 .97 
 
 
Happy Facilitation Bias 
 
1.82 .42 54 .67 
 
 
-3.22 -.67 53 .51 
 
 
Happy Disengage Bias 
 
-3.47 -.79 54 .43 
 
 
3.48 .71 53 .48 
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Table 9 
Study 2 Correlations between Bias Scores and Questionnaire Data 
 
STICSA Trait STICSA State 
DASS 
Depression SDS 
Dot Probe Scores 
    Angry Overall Bias -.17 -.12 -.10 .08 
Angry Facilitation Bias .03 -.11 -.03 -.04 
Angry Disengage Bias -.18 -.02 -.07 .11 
Fear Overall Bias -.12 -.04 -.06 .07 
Fear Facilitation Bias .03 .01 -.02 .04 
Fear Disengage Bias -.14 -.04 -.04 .03 
Happy Overall Bias -.10 -.06 -.03 .15 
Happy Facilitation Bias .06 -.06 -.01 .04 
Happy Disengage Bias -.16 .00 -.02 .11 
     Emotional Cueing Scores 
    Angry Overall Bias .01 .11 .02 .09 
Angry Facilitation Bias .12 .11 .13 -.06 
Angry Disengage Bias -.10 .05 -.09 .18 
Fear Overall Bias -.01 .02 -.03 .05 
Fear Facilitation Bias .00 -.01 -.03 .03 
Fear Disengage Bias -.01 .03 -.02 .04 
Happy Overall Bias .10 .03 .07 -.01 
Happy Facilitation Bias .09 .05 .06 .01 
Happy Disengage Bias .07 .01 .05 -.02 
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Table 10 
Study 2 Reliability of Dot Probe and Emotional Cueing Scores 
 
  
Dot Probe Task 
 
Emotional Cueing Task 
  
Permutation 95% Confidence Spearman-Brown 
 
Permutation 95% Confidence Spearman-Brown 
  
 Reliability Interval Corrected Reliability 
 
 Reliability Interval Corrected Reliability 
         Angry Trials 
       Congruency Score - - - 
 
.25 .06 to .42 .40 
Bias Score .07 -.12 to .26 .13 
 
.07 -.12 to .26 .13 
Facilitation Score .05 -.14 to .24 .10 
 
.08 -.11 to .27 .15 
Disengage Score .36 .18 to .51 .53 
 
.09 -.10 to .28 .16 
         Fear Trials 
       Congruency Score - - - 
 
.31 .13 to .47 .47 
Bias Score .01 -.18 to .20 .01 
 
.06 -.13 to .25 .12 
Facilitation Score .02 -.17 to .21 .04 
 
.02 -.17 to .21 .03 
Disengage Score .17 -.02 to .35 .29 
 
.09 -.10 to .28 .17 
         Happy Trials 
       Congruency Score - - - 
 
.24 .05 to .41 .39 
Bias Score -.04 -.23 to .15 - 
 
.30 .11 to .46 .46 
Facilitation Score .19 0 to .37 .32 
 
.14 -.05 to .32 .24 
Disengage Score .15 -.04 to .33 .26 
 
.41 .24 to .56 .58 
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Table 11 
Study 3 Means and Standard Deviations for Demographic and Questionnaire Data by Trait Anxiety Group 
 
  
Low Trait Anxiety Group 
 
High Trait Anxiety Group 
    
  
Mean SD 
 
Mean SD 
 
t 
 
p 
           Age 
 
20.34 (1.78) 
 
19.82 (1.88) 
 
1.73 
 
.086 
Sex (1=Female) 0.76 (0.43) 
 
0.77 (0.42) 
 
-0.08 
 
.940 
STICSA-Trait 26.71 (3.42) 
 
44.80 (8.05) 
 
-18.62 
 
.000 
STICSA-State 23.92 (2.75) 
 
34.03 (9.05) 
 
-9.65 
 
.000 
DASS-Depression 3.97 (5.4) 
 
13.87 (9.77) 
 
-7.96 
 
.000 
DASS-Anxiety 2.58 (3.81) 
 
13.14 (8.00) 
 
-10.71 
 
.000 
DASS-Stress 6.21 (6.18) 
 
17.70 (9.50) 
 
-9.08 
 
.000 
SDS 
 
11.95 (3.82) 
 
8.77 (3.35) 
 
5.54 
 
.000 
           SD = Standard Deviation; STICSA=State-Trait Inventory of Cognitive and Somatic Anxiety; DASS=Depression Anxiety  
Stress Scales; SDS= Social Desirability Scale 
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Table 12 
Study 3 Response Times for Dot Probe Task and Emotional Cueing Task by Group and Condition 
 
   
Dot Probe Task 
 
Emotional Cueing Task 
   
Incongruent 
 
Congruent 
 
Incongruent 
 
Congruent 
LTA – Calm Condition 
        
 
Angry Trials 
 
400 
 
399 
 
560 
 
477 
 
Happy Trials 
 
396 
 
401 
 
548 
 
482 
 
Neutral Trials 
 
- 
 
- 
 
543 
 
476 
          LTA - Anxious Condition 
        
 
Angry Trials 
 
405 
 
410 
 
545 
 
472 
 
Happy Trials 
 
405 
 
410 
 
531 
 
478 
 
Neutral Trials 
 
- 
 
- 
 
546 
 
471 
          HTA - Calm Condition 
        
 
Angry Trials 
 
415 
 
418 
 
552 
 
461 
 
Happy Trials 
 
414 
 
413 
 
537 
 
464 
 
Neutral Trials 
 
- 
 
- 
 
536 
 
459 
          HTA - Anxious Condition 
        
 
Angry Trials 
 
408 
 
414 
 
546 
 
454 
 
Happy Trials 
 
411 
 
411 
 
541 
 
464 
 
Neutral Trials 
 
- 
 
- 
 
527 
 
460 
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Table 13 
Study 3 Attentional Bias Scores by Group and Condition 
 
 
Dot Probe Task 
 
Emotional Cueing Task 
 
Bias Score (ms) t df p d 
 
Bias Score (ms) t df p d 
LTA - Calm Condition 
           
 
Angry Overall Bias 1.40 0.42 34 .68 
 
 
16.54 1.66 34 .11 
 
 
Angry Facilitation Bias 
     
 
-0.49 -0.18 34 .86 
 
 
Angry Disengage Bias 
     
 
17.03 1.89 34 .07 
 
 
Happy Overall Bias -5.06 -1.53 34 .13  
 
-0.66 -0.08 34 .94 
 
 
Happy Facilitation Bias      
 
-5.54 -1.79 34 .08 
 
 
Happy Disengage Bias      
 
4.89 0.60 34 .55 
 
      
 
  
  
 
 
 
LTA  - Anxious Condition  
    
 
   
 
 
 
 
Angry Overall Bias -5.08 -1.31 39 .20  
 
-2.45 -0.36 39 .72 
 
 
Angry Facilitation Bias      
 
-0.80 -0.30 39 .77 
 
 
Angry Disengage Bias      
 
-1.65 -0.27 39 .79 
 
 
Happy Overall Bias -5.58 -1.80 39 .08 
 
 
-22.00 -2.82 39 .01 -.45 
 
Happy Facilitation Bias 
     
 
-6.95 -1.61 39 .12 
 
 
Happy Disengage Bias      
 
-15.05 -2.31 39 .03 -.37 
      
 
   
 
 
 
HTA  - Calm Condition 
    
 
   
 
 
 
 
Angry Overall Bias -3.33 -0.66 42 .51 
 
 
13.88 1.86 39 .07 
 
 
Angry Facilitation Bias 
     
 
-1.38 -0.41 39 .68 
 
 
Angry Disengage Bias 
     
 
15.25 2.51 39 .02 .40 
 
Happy Overall Bias 1.56 0.43 42 .67  
 
-4.48 -0.72 39 .48 
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Happy Facilitation Bias      
 
-5.05 -1.24 39 .22 
 
 
Happy Disengage Bias      
 
0.58 0.11 39 .91 
 
      
 
   
 
 
 
HTA  - Anxious Condition  
    
 
   
 
 
 
 
Angry Overall Bias -5.92 -2.33 38 .03 -.37 
 
25.13 2.98 37 .01 .48 
 
Angry Facilitation Bias 
     
 
5.76 2.32 37 .03 .38 
 
Angry Disengage Bias 
     
 
19.37 2.43 37 .02 .39 
 
Happy Overall Bias -0.13 -0.04 38 .97 
 
 
10.13 1.23 37 .23 
 
 
Happy Facilitation Bias 
     
 
-3.97 -1.30 37 .20 
 
 
Happy Disengage Bias 
     
 
14.11 2.08 37 .04 .34 
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Table 14 
Study 3 Reliability of Dot Probe and Emotional Cueing Scores 
   
Angry Trials 
 
Happy Trials 
   
Permutation 95% Confidence Spearman-Brown 
 
Permutation 95% Confidence Spearman-Brown 
Difference Score  Reliability Interval Corrected Reliability 
 
 Reliability Interval Corrected Reliability 
          Dot Probe Bias 
       
 
Overall Sample .28 .13 to .39 .44 
 
.09 -.07 to .22 .17 
 
Calm Condition .42 .22 to .59 .59 
 
.17 -.05 to .38 .29 
 
Anxious Condition .08 -.14 to .30 .15 
 
.04 -.18 to .26 .09 
          Emotional Cueing Congruency 
      
 
Overall Sample .39 .25 to .52 .56 
 
.42 .28 to .54 .59 
 
Calm Condition .42 .21 to .59 .59 
 
.47 .27 to .63 .64 
 
Anxious Condition .39 .18 to .56 .56 
 
.40 .20 to .57 .57 
          Emotional Cueing Bias 
       
 
Overall Sample .05 -.11 to .21 .10 
 
.07 -.09 to .23 .12 
 
Calm Condition .06 -.17 to .28 .11 
 
.06 -.17 to .28 .11 
 
Anxious Condition .05 -.17 to .27 .10 
 
.08 -.15 to .30 .15 
          Emotional Cueing Facilitation 
      
 
Overall Sample -.15 -.30 to .01 - 
 
.10 -.06 to .25 .19 
 
Calm Condition -.12 -.34 to .11 - 
 
.07 -.16 to .29 .13 
 
Anxious Condition -.17 -.38 to .05 - 
 
.14 -.09 to .35 .24 
          Emotional Cueing Disengage 
      
 
Overall Sample .07 -.09 to .23 .13 
 
.06 -.10 to .22 .11 
 
Calm Condition .08 -.15 to .30 .15 
 
.06 -.17 to .28 .11 
 
Anxious Condition .09 -.14 to .31 .16 
 
.07 -.15 to .29 .13 
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Table 15 
Study 3 Correlations between Emotional Cueing Biases and Questionnaire Data 
 
 
STICSA Trait DASS Depression SDS 
Overall Sample (N=153) 
   Angry Overall Bias .063 .074 .030 
Angry Facilitation Bias .056 -.015 .104 
Angry Disengage Bias .049 .088 -.007 
Happy Overall Bias .131 .045 -.043 
Happy Facilitation Bias .028 .001 .056 
Happy Disengage Bias .134 .051 -.079 
    Calm Condition (n=75) 
   Angry Overall Bias -.011 .089 .106 
Angry Facilitation Bias .043 .003 .157 
Angry Disengage Bias -.030 .101 .057 
Happy Overall Bias -.035 -.033 .002 
Happy Facilitation Bias -.012 -.014 .074 
Happy Disengage Bias -.030 -.028 -.038 
    Anxious Condition (n=78) 
   Angry Overall Bias .140 .049 -.038 
Angry Facilitation Bias .077 -.016 .038 
Angry Disengage Bias .126 .060 -.055 
Happy Overall Bias .272
*
 .108 -.072 
Happy Facilitation Bias .067 .014 .042 
Happy Disengage Bias .289
*
 .122 -.109 
  
9
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